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Abstract 
In 1993, there were an estimated two million hosts connected to the Inter-
net with a user population of around twenty million, in seventy countries. 
Increasingly, the information being transmitted within the Internet commu-
nity is sensitive and concerns about data privacy and integrity are growing. 
This thesis examines the internet environment and the issues that have lead 
to this raised level of concern regarding security. We will also examine some 
of the primitive cryptographic services that are available to promote trust 
between users. ' 
It is universally acknowledged that reliable authentication of communicating 
entities is essential for achieving security in a distributed computing envi-
ronment. The design of such systems as Kerberos, SPX and more recently 
KryptoKnight and Kuperee, have largely been successful in addressing the 
problem. We will examine two of these systems. The first, Kerberos is the 
best known of these efforts and was developed at Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) as part of Project Athena. It is based on the weU-known 
Needham and Schroeder protocol and incorporates modifications that were 
proposed by Denning and Sacco. The second, KryptoKnight, is more recent. 
Unlike Kerberos which uses timestamps to ensure freshness, KryptoKnight 
relies on exchange of nonces. The common element within these implemen-
tations is the need for a trusted third-party authentication service. This 
essentially, requires a great deal of trust to be invested in the authentication 
server which adds a level of complexity and reduces system flexibility. 
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties was 
first suggested by M. Rabin in "Transactions protected by beacons," Journal 
of Computer and System Sciences, Vol 27, pp 256-267,1983. In this thesis we 
revive Rabin's ideas which have been largely overlooked in the psist decade. 
In particular we present a novel approach to the authentication problem 
bcLsed on a service called Beacon which continuously broadccists certified 
nonces. We show that tliis approach considerably simplifies authentication 
and the distribution of keys. We illustrate the impact of such a service 
by "Beaconizing" the Needham and Schroeder public key protocol. The 
modified protocol would be suitable for deployment at upper layers of the 
communication protocol stack. 
The results of this thesis are to be pubhshed in: 
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Beacon based authentication. In Pro-
ceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ES-
ORICS'94), Brighton, UK, Nov 1994, accepted for publication by Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, 
1994. 
A less technical version of the paper is to be presented at: 
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Network security featuring beacon based 
authentication. In Proceedings of Fifth Australasian Conference on Infor-
mation Systems, Melbourne, Australia, Sept 1994, accepted for publication. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In the past thirty years, the rapid growth in the use of electronic data com-
munication has been quite spectacular. There can be very few aspects of 
daily life that have not been transformed by this so called revolution. Much 
of the data routinely transmitted is sensitive either for reasons concerning 
individual privacy or commercial confidentiality. Justifiably, there is a grow-
ing apprehension about data secrecy and integrity. If we hved in a trustwor-
thy society, where no individual stole or misused information, data security 
would not be an issue. Alas that is not the case. 
The largest single collection of computer networks is referred to as the Inter-
net. Today there are an estimated twenty million users who use the Internet 
in seventy countries. The Internet is currently used to carry data from a 
variety of sources including research organizations, government bodies and 
business. As time passes more and more of the information being transmit-
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ted is sensitive. 
With such a large user base, it is hardly surprising that one or two "bad 
apples" have found their way into this world wide community. Their efforts 
have not gone unnoticed. Clifford StoU's book "The Cuckoo's Egg" [41 
describes the activities of the so-called Hanover Hacker. Robert Morris' 
rogue worm program [39, 35] received wide media publicity. In October 
1989, the worm program Worms Against Nuclear Killers (WANK) infected 
a NASA network [7]. 
Very little in the way of security services currently exist within the. most 
used implementations of the communication protocols used for within the 
Internet. This makes the Internet itself vulnerable to various types of at-
tacks. There is no systematic provision for protecting the confidentiality of 
user communications and in many cases it is comparatively easy for intruders 
to intercept, understand, alter communications, or even originate forgeries. 
Since there is no standard effective method for the authentication of network 
principals, the Internet provides an excellent vehicle for allowing criminals 
to remain anonymous while committing theft or acts of vandalism. 
In this thesis we shall be concerned with the provision of security services 
for an internet environment. We examine some of the security issues being 
universally expressed and explore various solutions. This thesis is laid out 
in the following manner: 
• Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to the Internet and provides 
a glimpse into the types of issues and concerns that are being expressed 
within the community. 
• Chapter 3 introduces the internet protocol suite which provides the 
means for the Internet to function. Currently (1994), the internet 
protocol suite is the most widely implemented, non-vendor specific 
protocol. The discussion within this chapter omits much of the the 
technical information and limits itself to the minimum that is required 
to understand the internet environment. 
• Chapter 4 is concerned with the security issues that are related to'the 
internet protocol suite. The approach taken is to keep the discussion 
informal. This chapter aims to give the reader a flavour of the issues 
involved by examining some of the "holes" that have been found. 
• In Chapter 5 the discussion focuses on the primitive mechanisms and 
services that are available to provide security services. 
• Chapter 6 describes two very well-known Authentication and Key 
Distribution systems. The first of these called Kerberos, was designed 
for and is currently used by, a number of internet environments. The 
second, KryptoKnight, is a more recent development and wiU probably 
gain more prominence in the future. 
• Chapter 7 is the result of original research carried out by myself. 
Professor Seberry, and Dr. Zheng. We introduce a new security service 
called Beacon which will simplify authentication and key distribution. 
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This novel approach has been inspired by the work carried out M. 
Rabin in 1983. These ideas presented by Rabin have been largely 
overlooked by the research community during the past decade. We 
describe Rabin's ideas before modifying them so that the Beacon may 
be used to provide a new security service for communicating principals. 
• Chapter 8, which is my own, illustrates the advantage of a bea-
con based approach by "beaconizing" the well-known Needham and 
Schroeder protocol. The discussion begins by briefly outline the Need-
ham and Schroeder protocol using asymmetric keys. Next, the weak-
i 
ness pointed out by Denning and Sacco and their solution to the 
problem is described. Finally, the Needham and Schroeder protocol 
is modified to take advantage of a Beacon. The chapter shows that the 
modified protocol simplifies authentication and key distribution and 
has advantages over both the Needham and Schroeder protocol and 
modified protocol suggested by Denning and Sacco. 
• Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by describing future work. 
• Appendix A contains the paper: 
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Beacon based authentication. In 
Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Se-
curity (ESORICS'94), Brighton, UK, Nov 1994, accepted for pubUca-
tion by Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin-
Heidelberg-New York, 1994. 
ESORICS'94 report a one third acceptance rate. 
• Appendix B contains the less technical paper featuring a Beacon. 
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Network security featuring beacon 
based authentication. In Proceedings of Fifth Australasian Conference 
on Information Systems, Melbourne, Australia, Sept 1994, accepted 
for publication. 
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Chapter 2 
The Internet 
In the past decade, the rapid evolution of electronic data communication 
using the Internet has been breath taking. This growth and reliance on 
electronic communication has increased concern about data privacy and in-
tegrity. Much effort is currently being devoted to providing security services 
for a variety of internet communication environments. In this chapter we 
give a brief overview of the Internet and the security concerns that are being 
expressed universally. 
2.1 The Internet 
The Internet is a complex worldwide web of individual computer networks 
which connects hosts in seventy countries. All hosts within the Internet 
(upper-case "I" ) use a set of protocols called the internet (all lower case) 
protocol suite. Topographically, the Internet consists of a set of large net-
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works which are interconnected. These upper-level networks are made of an 
interconnection of smaller networks, which in turn are made up of subnet-
works and so on. Hosts on the Internet are able to communicate over vast 
physical distances by resolving addresses in this hierarchical fashion. 
A survey conducted in July 1991 [21] by SRI International Network Infor-
mation Center estimated the number of hosts that were directly connected 
to the Internet. Their findings placed the number of hosts at some 535,000 
in 16,000 domains (a network that as an Internet address). The largest ten 
upper-level domains are listed in Table 2.1. 
By 1993, the number of hosts connected to the Internet had jumped to 
over 2 million [18] with an estimated user population of 20 million. That 
is, currently in 1994, there are over twenty million people in some seventy 
countries that can be contacted directly within a few seconds. New users are 
estimated to be joining the Internet community at between 15 to 20 percent 
per month. 
2.2 A Brief History of the Internet 
Since the invention of the computer, the United States Department of De-
fense (DoD) has been one of the largest purchasers in the world. In the 
sixties there was a growing realization that communications between diverse 
computer hardware, from multiple vendors, was a major problem. In the late 
sixties the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), now called DARPA 
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Name Description Number of Hosts 
EDU Education 206,000 
COM Commercial 144,000 
GOV Government 36,000 
MIL Military 26,000 
AU Australia 22,000 
DE Germany 21,000 
CA Canada 19,000 
ORG Organization 15,000 
SE Sweden 12,000 
CH Switzerland 10,000 
Table 2.1: 1991 SRI survey - Ten Largest Domains 
(Defense ARPA), began funding research into computerized communications 
and networking. 
Work on the ARPANet [34], which grew into what we know as the Internet, 
began in 1969. The ARPANet, when first proposed, was staggering in its 
boldness. For instance, it proposed the use of leased lines to communicate 
at rates of 50 kilobits per second. Network communication over long dis-
tances using such high bandwidths was unheard of at that time. ARPANet 
became an important test-bed for pioneering research into packet switching 
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technology and computer inter-operability. In tlie following decade, the 70s, 
many protocols and architectures were discussed and prototyped. Much of 
the success of the Internet is due to this early work. 
What we now call the Internet began life in 1980 when most of the work 
on architecture and protocols was completed. The new protocol suite, the 
internet protocol suite, was adopted by the DoD which began the process 
of converting all its computers connected to ARPANet to the new technol-
ogy. The transition was completed in 1983 when the Secretary of Defense 
mandated that all DoD computers connected to its long-haul networks must 
i 
use the internet protocol suite. This in effect tied machines connected to 
ARPANet, which eventually became the Internet, to this set of protocols. 
Also in 1983, the military computers were split from ARPANet to form a 
new network caUed MILNet, leaving ARPANet to be a network dominated 
by the research community. 
In 1984, the DoD adopted a set of protocol standards to be used by the 
military which were very closely based on the work funded by the ARPA. 
The standards include the following protocols [3]: 
• Internet Protocol (IP). A connectionless service to communicate across 
networks. The service does not guarantee reliable delivery (MIL-STD-
1777). 
• Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). A reliable end-to-end service 
for transferring data (MIL-STD-1778). 
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• File Transfer Protocol (FTP) . A simple application protocol for trans-
ferring files. (MIL-STD-1780). 
• Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). A simple electronic mail pro-
tocol (MIL-STD-1781). 
• TELNET Protocol. A simple virtual terminal protocol. (MIL-STD-
1782). 
Although the actual internet protocol suite consists of several other pro-
tocols, the five above are the only ones officially adopted by the DoD as 
standards. This adoption was probably responsible for the term " T C P / I P " 
which is commonly used to refer to the internet protocol suite. 
To encourage acceptance of its protocol standard, the ARPA began the task 
of coaxing universities and research institutes to adopt the internet protocol 
suite. A key spoke in its strategy, and one which had a profound effect on 
the evolution of the Internet, was to fund the implementation of the internet 
protocol suite under Unix. The ARPA granted the University of Berkeley 
the task of integrating these protocols into the university's Berkeley Software 
Distribution (BSD Unix). During this period a large number of university 
computer science departments were running some variant of Berkeley Unix. 
What ' s more, many of these departments were in the process of installing lo-
cal area networks (LANs) and the lack of alternatives made the new protocol 
suite very attractive. 
3 0 0 0 9 0 3 1 3 2 0 5 3 9 
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2.3 Internet Security 
The initial project on the protocols and architecture was sponsored by the 
ARPA to demonstrate the feasibility of long-haul packet switching technol-
ogy. In the two decades that followed, during which the Internet took shape, 
security was not the primary concern. Greater emphasis was placed on issues 
such as efficiency and inter-operability. As a result very little in the way of 
security services currently exist within widely used implementations of the 
protocol suite. 
Today there are an estimated twenty miUion users who use the Internet 
in seventy countries. Internet is currently used to carry data from a va-
riety of sources including research organizations, government bodies and 
business. Increasingly, the information being transmitted is sensitive and 
concerns about data privacy and integrity are growing. During 1993 the 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) received 1334 reports of se-
curity breaches. The FBI estimates.that 80 to 90 percent of computer crimes 
it investigates use the Internet to gain access to the computer system [18]. 
Hence the proposal and implementation of security protocols which are fea-
sible and practical for the Internet is a pressing and growing area of research. 
Chapter 3 
The internet Protocol Suite 
The term " T C P / I P " is commonly misused to refer to the collection of pro-
tocols which together provide end-to-end communications in an internet en-
vironment. This common reference is derived from two specific protocols 
which are included in the protocol suite, the Transmission Control Protocol 
(TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP). A more correct term for this collection 
of protocols would the internet (all lower case) protocol suite. 
The internet protocol suite was designed to allow hosts connected to different 
network types to communicate with one another. The suite currently exist in 
a number of networking environments including local area networks (LANs), 
land-based long haul networks and mobile radio networks. The internet 
protocol suite at present is the most widely implemented and used, non-
vendor specific protocol. It is the basis by which Internet operates. 
This chapter gives a brief description of the internet protocol suite. The 
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discussion omits a great deal of the technical information and is limited to 
the minimum that is required to understand the internet environment. For 
a detailed description, the reader is encouraged read the following references 
[9, 10, 38]. 
3.1 An Overview of internet Environment 
3.1.1 Brief History 
The development of the internet protocols was sponsored by the United 
States Department of Defense (DoD) under the Advance Research Project 
Agency (ARPA). The projects purpose was to demonstrate the feasibility of 
long-haul packet switching technology. The following are the milestones in 
the development of the internet protocol suite. 
( 
• 1969. ARPA initiated a research and development project to build a 
four nodes wide area network to be called ARPANet. The four nodes 
were to be located at the University of California at Santa Barbara 
(UCSB), the University of CaUfornia at Los Angles (UCLA), SRI In-
ternational and Systems Development Corporate. 
• 1972. ARPANet was publicly demonstrated in order to prove the fea-
sibility of long-haul packet switching technology. ARPANet consisted 
of approximately twenty packet switchers and fifty hosts. 
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• mid 70's. Work toward internet protocol suite continued. Research 
centres work on the protocol architectures extended to include re-
searchers in other countries. TCP prototype is implemented at various 
centres. 
• 1979. Work on the internet suite architecture was by-and-large com-
plete and had taken it current form. 
• 1980. ARPRA began the task of converting all its research computers 
to the new protocol suite. The work was completed in 1983. 
i 
• 1983. The new internet protocol was adopted as the new US military 
standard. The military network MILNet splits from ARPANet. Com-
mercial companies embraced the new standard. The new standard was 
incorporated into Berkeley Unix. 
3.1.2 Basic Structure 
The protocols that make up the internet protocol suite can be placed in a 
four layer stack: Application Layer; Transport Layer; Network Layer and 
Datalink Layer. Figure 3.1 illustrates this. 
This logical structure of the layered protocols enables computers to commu-
nicate and determine the message sequence. For useful communication to 
take place, applications that are on two physically separated hosts, must be 
able to communicate. Within the internet protocol suite an application re-
ceives data from, and transmits data to, the Transport layer. The two most 
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internet PROTOCOLS ISO/OSI MODEL 
APPLICATION 
TRANSPORT 
NETWORK 
DATA LINK 
FTP TELNET SMTP DNS OTHERS 
TCP UDP OTHERS 
IP 
ICMP 
ARP RARP 
IEEE 802.3 
ETHERNET 
IEEE 802.4 
TOKEN BUS 
IEEE 802.5 
TOKEN RING 
X.25 OTHERS 
LEVELS 6 AND 7 
LEVELS 
LEVEL4 
LEVELS 
LEVEL 2 
Figure 3.1: The internet Protocol Stack 
commonly used transportation mechanisms are: TCP (Transmission Con-
trol Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram Protocol). The difference between 
the two is covered later in this chapter. For an application that uses TCP, 
such as FTP (File Transfer Protocol), data passes between the application 
and the TCP module. Alternatively, some applications are designed to use 
UDP as the transportation service. SNMP (Simple Network Management 
Protocol) is probably the best known application that uses UDP. 
In a similar fashion, the Transport layer exchanges data with the Network 
layer which in turn exchanges data with the Datalink layer. We can thus 
summarize the dataflow between two application, such as FTP, in Figure 3.2. 
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FTP 
TCP 
t 
IP 
i 
ETHERNET 
\ 1 
FTP 
f 
TCP 
t 
IP 
ETHERNET 
1 \ 
Figure 3.2: Communication Between to FTP Applications 
3.2 Datalink Layer 
A key feature of the internet protocol stack is that each layer within the 
hierarchy hides the details of the layer underneath from the layer above. 
In the case of the Datalink layer, IP hides the working of the particular 
Datalink layer driver used from the Transport layer protocols. This has 
the advantage that if there is an advance in network technology, it can be 
incorporated into the internet stack by implementing a new driver. The new 
driver which would be part of the Datalink layer would communicate with 
the IP module in a weU defined manner. Thus allowing networks to evolve 
by taking advantage of the advances with a minimum of change to the stack. 
Datalink layer modules can be divided into two broad categories; those which 
provide Local Area Network (LAN) services and those that provide Wide 
Area Network (WAN) services. The Datalink layer within LANs are designed 
to basically provide a service where discrete pieces of data are passed between 
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participating hosts. Tliese hosts are directly connected to the same LAN. 
Cooperation between peer Datalink modules is limited aside from this basic 
service and data transmitted at this level within a LAN undergoes little 
processing other then error detection and correction. 
Datalink services in WANs such as the private ARPANet and X.25 are more 
comprehensive. Hosts in these types of networks can be thought of as being 
attached by point-to-point links. Packet switching nodes, also called gate-
ways or routers, act in conjunction with one another to provide store and 
forward processing of data frames. WANs often attempt to provide reliable 
packet delivery which makes the service provided by the Datalink layer far 
more complicated. 
A great deal of work has been done to make the internet protocol suite avail-
able on the widest variety of networking environments possible. To keep the 
discussion simple, this chapter will provide a very simple description of the 
Datalink layer services provided by one type of LAN, the Ethernet. Ethernet 
has become a very widely used LAN technology within the Internet commu-
nity. Figure 3.3 illustrates the network that will be used to demonstrate 
various concepts. For simplicity it will be assumed that the open network is 
some generic WAN. 
3.2.1 Ethernet 
Within the internet stack, a unit of data is named according to the protocol it 
has reached. That is, as data travel down the stack, the name by which they 
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Figure 3.3: internet Network 
are referred to changes. Within Ethernet the data are called an Ethernet 
frame. Once the data are passed up to the IP module they are referred to 
as an IP packet. 
An Ethernet frame contains the destination address, source address, type 
field, and the IP packet which contains the message. An Ethernet address 
is six octets in length. Every device has its own Ethernet address and lis-
tens for Ethernet frames with that destination address. All devices also 
listen for Ethernet frames for a destination address FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF 
(in hexadecimal), which is called the broadcast address. 
Ethernet uses CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense and Multiple Access with Collision 
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Detection). CSMA/CD means that aU devices communicate on a single 
medium over which only one can transmit at a given time, however all hosts 
can receive simultaneously. If two hosts try to transmit at the same instant, 
the collision is detected, and both hosts wait a short random period before 
attempting to re-transmit. Since both hosts calculate their random period 
independently, there is overwhelming probability that the same collision will 
not re-occur. 
3.3 Network Layer 
t 
The IP module is central to the success of internet technology. The primary 
task of the IP protocols is to provide end-to-end packet delivery between 
hosts on separate networks. To accomplish this, the IP addressing permits 
hosts to be identified by both network number and host number. Thus 
building a single logical network from multiple physical networks. This in-
terconnection of physical networks has provided the protocol suite its name: 
internet. In addition the Network layer also provides fragmentation and 
reassembly of IP packets so that any size limitation placed by the individ-
ual Datalink services can be overcome. This allows large IP datagrams to 
navigate various network technologies between physically separated hosts. 
The main functionality provided by the Network layer are contained in four 
protocols as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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IP Address Ethernet Address 
192.1.1.1 08-00-39-76-2F-CB 
192.1.1.2 08-00-4A-21-A7-25 
192.1.1.4 08-00-A0-19-AC-84 
Table 3.1: Example ARP Table 
3.3 .1 Address Resolution Protocol 
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) is part of the Network layer and is used 
to resolve host addresses. To keep the discussion simple we assume that the 
under lying network is an Ethernet. 
A R P Table for Address Translation 
Address translations are performed using a look-up table (see Table 3.1) 
called the ARP table which is stored in memory and contains a row for each 
known host. There is a column for IP addresses and a column for Ethernet 
addresses. When translating an IP address to an Ethernet address, the table 
is searched for a matching IP address. 
The convention for expressing the four octet IP address is to write each octet 
as a decimal number and the four numbers which are separated by a fuU-
stop. The six octet Ethernet address, by convention, has each octet written 
22 CHAPTER 3. THE INTERNET PROTOCOL SUITE 
in hexadecimal form and separated by either a minus sign or a colon. 
The ARP table is necessary because the IP addresses and Ethernet addresses 
are independent. That is, an algorithm cannot be used to translate an IP 
address to an Ethernet address. The IP address is selected by the network 
administrator based on the location of the computer on the network. When 
the computer is moved to a different location, its IP address may be changed 
to correspond. An Ethernet address is selected by the manufacturer based 
on the Ethernet address space licensed by the manufacturer. When the 
Ethernet interface board changes, the Ethernet address changes. 
K 
During normal operation, a network application such as FTP, sends a mes-
sage to TCP for delivery. The message of course contains the name of the 
intended message recipient. In turn TCP sends a corresponding TCP mes-
sage to the IP module. The destination address is known to the IP module 
as it has been passed down from the application and the ARP table is used 
to look-up the destination Ethernet address. Once the Ethernet address is 
known, an IP packet can be constructed and is given to the Ethernet driver 
together with the destination Ethernet address. 
ARP Request/Response Pair 
ARP messages are used in the event that an application requests a message 
be delivered to a host whose Ethernet address is not known. That is, the 
translation is missing from the ARP table. The ARP Request/Response 
protocol is used to find the missing address and quickly update the table. 
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Source Target 
IP Address 
Ethernet Address 
192.1.1.1 
08-00-39-76-2F-CB 
192.1.1.3 
< blank > 
Table 3.2: ARP Request Summarized 
To accomplish this, the following five steps are taken: 
1. The outgoing IP request is queued. This enables the packet to be 
processed after the table is updated. 
2. An ARP request packet containing the IP address which requires a 
corresponding Ethernet address, is broadcast to aU hosts connected to 
the local network. Every computer's Ethernet driver receives the frame 
and once the type field is examined, the request is passed up to the 
ARP module. The ARP request packet is summarized in Table 3.2. 
3. Each ARP module examines the Target IP address contained in the 
broadcast request and if it matches its own IP address, a response is 
sent to the Source Ethernet Address. An ARP response packet has 
the source and target fields swapped as shown in Table 3.3. 
4. The response is received by the original sender. The Ethernet driver 
looks at the type field in the Ethernet frame and passes the ARP 
response to the ARP module. The ARP module examines the ARP 
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Source Target 
IP Address 
Ethernet Address 
192.1.1.3 
08-00-28-10-28-A5 
192.1.1.1 
08-00-39-76-2F-CB 
Table 3.3: ARP Response Summarized 
packet and adds the sender's IP and Ethernet addresses to its ARP 
table. , , 
5. The new translation having been installed, the request which was 
queued (step 1), can be processed. The IP address to Ethernet ad-
dress translation is performed and the Ethernet frame is transmitted. 
Each computer has a separate ARP table for each of its network interfaces. 
If the target computer does not exist, there wiU be no ARP response and 
the translation would not be available. In such an event the queued message 
would timeout and ARP would discard outgoing packets. The upper layer 
protocols would be informed. 
3.3.2 Internet Protocol 
The IP module and its route table are central to working in internet. IP uses 
this in-memory table to make routing decisions for packets traveling across 
the local LAN. The content of the route table is defined by the network 
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administrator. Mistakes can block communication. 
IP Names and Address 
The Internet address space is administered by the NIC (Network Information 
Center). All internets that are connected to the single world-wide Internet 
must use network numbers assigned by the NIC. Even if it is not intended 
for the local network to be connected to the Internet, the network address 
space should stiU be obtained from the NIC. This would avoid difficulties 
which may arise if eventually a connection to the Internet were required. 
i 
Each host is assigned an IP address by the network administrator. An 
IP address consists of a four octet number (32 bits). This address space 
is divided in to two parts: the most significant portion defines the network 
address and the remaining bits define the host address. For a type C network, 
which is the most common type, the three most significant octets are used 
as the IP network address. The remaining eight bits are used to assign host 
addresses. A type C network, as a consequence, can support a maximum of 
254 hosts (addresses 0 and 255 are reserved). 
To make it easier for people, most computers also have a name. IP uses a 
translation table (see Table 3.4) to convert between the name and address 
assigned to each host. For small networks, this translation data is often kept 
on each computer. For larger networks, this translation data is stored on a 
server and accessed across the network when needed. 
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IP Host Address Host Name 
192.1.1.1 BOTTLEBRUSH 
192.1.1.2 WATTLE 
192.1.1.3 FLAMETREE 
192.1.1.4 EUCALYPT 
Table 3.4: IP Host Name Translation Table 
i 
It is also usual for IP networks to be assigned names. For simplicity we 
have chosen to use a flat name space for the network names. This method 
has been abandoned by the Internet community for some time. However 
flat names are stiU used by smaller internet networks. For an explanation 
of the more complex hierarchical naming system, the reader is referred to 
9]. In our example there are three IP networks which are named after three 
Australian cities as shown in Table 3.5. Thus from tables 3.4 and 3.5, it 
can be deduced that BOTTLEBRUSH is host number 1 and WATTLE is 
host number 2 on the network called WOLLONGONG. Therefore WATTLE 
is address as WOLLONGONG.WATTLE. Alternatively, the address can be 
written as W0LL0NG0NG.2 . 
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Address Name 
192.1.1 WOLLONGONG 
192.1.2 SYDNEY 
192.1.3 MELBOURNE 
Table 3.5: IP Network Name Translation Table 
Direct Routing 
Direct routing is the simplest manner in which hosts can communicate using 
IP and involves two hosts that are on the same network. That is, suppose 
WATTLE had an IP packet for FLAMETREE (see Figure 3.3), then the IP 
header would contain WATTLE's IP address as the source, and FLAME-
TREE's IP address as the destination. Likewise, the Ethernet header would 
contain WATTLE's Ethernet address as the source and FLAMETREE's 
Ethernet address as the destination. This is summarized in Table 3.6, where 
for the purpose of illustrative clarity, the Ethernet addresses are represented 
as the host's name in lower-case. For this simple case, IP simply becomes an 
overhead as little is gained over the service offered by Ethernet. However, 
IP does add to the cost by consuming CPU cycles and network bandwidth. 
To correctly address the packet, WATTLE uses its route table. The decision 
WATTLE must make is, given the FLAMETREE IP address, where should 
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Address Source Destination 
IP header 
Ethernet header 
WOLLONGONG.WATTLE 
wattle 
WOLLONGONG.FLAMETREE 
flametree 
Table 3.6: Addresses contained in an Ethernet frame and IP packet 
network direct/indirect flag Gateway interface number 
WOLLONGONG direct < blank > 
\ 
1 
SYDNEY indirect EUCALYPT 1 
MELBOURNE indirect EUCALYPT 1 
Table 3.7: WATTLE's Route Table 
the IP packet be sent. The route table, illustrated in Table 3.7, contains one 
row for each known network. The primary columns in the route table are: 
IP Network, direct/indirect flag. Gateway, and Network Interface Number. 
This table is referred to by IP for each outgoing IP packet. 
The protocol extracts the network portion from FLAMETREE's address, 
w a t t l e ' s IP module is able to scan the first column of the table to look for 
a match. In this example a match is found on the first row. From the other 
information in the first row, one can see that FLAMETREE can be reached 
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directly through network interface number 1. An ARP table translation 
is done on FLAMETREE's IP address before sending the Ethernet frame 
directly to FLAMETREE. 
Indirect Routing 
Before proceeding with indirect routing let us briefly re-examine the network 
as illustrated in Figure 3.3. The internet is composed of three Ethernets. The 
hosts, EUCALYPT, IRONBARK, and SILKY-OAK act as the networks IP 
gateways. Each network has four hosts and each host has its own IP address 
i 
and Ethernet address. 
When computers WATTLE and EUCALYPT communicate, direct routing 
is used because both hosts are on the same IP network. However, when 
WATTLE communicates with WARATAH, EUCALYPT must forward the 
IP packet to SILKY-OAK for final delivery. This communication is, as the 
name suggests, indirect. This routing of IP packets is done by IP modules 
and happens transparently for the layers above IP. 
Table 3.8 summarizes the addressing WATTLE will use, after consulting 
the Routing Table, to send a IP packet to WARATAH. Notice that in this 
indirect routing example, the destination IP address is WARATAH's, but 
WATTLE must send the packet to EUCALYPT for forwarding. That is, the 
destination Ethernet address is EUCALYPT's. 
The IP packet will arrive at EUCALYPT's IP module via its WOLLON-
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address source destination 
IP header 
Ethernet header 
WOLLONGONG.WATTLE 
wattle 
SYDNEY.WARATAH 
eucalypt 
Table 3.8: Addresses Used in Indirect Address. 
network direct/indirect flag router interface number 
WOLLONGONG direct < blank > 1 
SYDNEY indirect OPEN-GATEl 2 
MELBOURNE indirect OPEN-GATEl 2 
Table 3.9: EUCALYPT's Route Table 
GONG network interface. Since EUCALYPT is a gateway it must be con-
nected to at least two networks: the Ethernet LAN and the opennet WAN. 
The IP module will examine the destination and find it does not match its 
own. EUCALYPT's IP module will examine its Routing Table, shown in 
Table 3.9, and re-addressing the packet as summarized in Table 3.10. 
Notice that EUCALYPT also uses indirect addressing to pass the message to 
OPEN-GATEl which is the next gateway between EUCALYPT and SILKY-
OAK. OPEN-GATEl in turn will do the same, passing the IP packet to the 
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address source destination 
IP header 
opennet header 
WATTLE 
eucalypt 
WARATAH 
open-gatel 
Table 3.10: EUCALYPT's Route Table 
next gateway and so on until it arrives at SILKY-OAK. The packet can 
then be delivered by direct addressing. A second point worth mentioning is 
that the underlying network technology may change may times during the 
packets journey, however the service provided by the IP modules remains 
essentially the same. 
3.3 .3 Internet Control Message Protocol 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is a part of the Network layer and 
is used to modify some aspect of the sender's behavior. An ICMP message 
could be sent by either an intermediate gateway or the destination host to 
inform the sender of a perceived problem. The following list illustrates the 
type of massaging that is carried out. This is by no means a complete list. 
1. Echo Response and Reply. This message pair is used by a host to test 
if the destination machine is reachable. 
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2. Destination Unreachable. When a gateway is unable to deliver a data-
gram, this message is sent to inform the sender. 
3. Source Quench. The message is sent by a host to request that the rate 
at which datagrams are sent be slowed. 
4. Re-direct. If the configuration of internet has changed then the rout-
ing table in an individual host may need to be updated. The re-direct 
message essentially provides this mechanism. When the primary gate-
way detects that the sender of a message is not using the optimum 
route, it sends this message to update the host's routing table. » 
5. Datagram Time Exceeded. This message is sent back to the sender 
by the gateway which has discarded a message because its time to live 
counter reached zero. 
6. Datagram Parameter Problem. This message reports to the sender 
problems in the datagram header. 
7. Address Mask Request and Reply. Subnetworks allow multiple physi-
cal networks to share a single IP network address space. This message 
pair allows a host to request its subnetwork mask information. 
3.3.4 Reverse Address Resolution Protocol 
Reverse Address Resolution Protocol (RARP) provide a service that is the 
reverse of ARP (see Section 3.3.1). That is, suppose that a host knows its 
own Ethernet address but wishes to learn its IP address. This situation 
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could arise while a host is starting up. RARP allows that host to broadcast 
a message in order to obtain its IP address information from another host 
on the same network. 
3.4 Transport Layer 
TCP and UDP are the two most used protocols which reside above the 
IP. Their purpose is to provide applications with an end to end connection 
mechanism which hides the details of the network connections. Layers below 
the Transport layer are concerned with transmission and routing of packets 
across interconnected networks. In other words a "host to host" connection. 
By contrast, the Transport layer protocols provide a reliable and efficient 
delivery service between applications. 
Both TCP and UDP are designed to allow multiple applications on a particu-
lar host to communicate concurrently. Both distinguish between applications 
within a host by a mechanism called ports. These ports have a sixteen bit 
integer identification and are local to a given host. Though both protocols 
use ports, they are independent of each other and the port numbers are 
separately assigned. That is, the name of the transportation protocol used, 
is included in the IP header and so, the packet is passed up to the Trans-
port layer protocol before the port number is evaluated. Secondly, since 
the IP addresses are evaluated below the Transport layer, a combination of 
the mechanisms is able to uniquely identify any communicating application 
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within an internet. 
3.4.1 User Datagram Protocol 
UDP offers to applications a connection-less datagram service which does 
not guarantee delivery. It provides a mechanism by which multiple applica-
tions on a single host can concurrently send and receive messages. The UDP 
datagrams contain both the source and the destination port addresses, giv-
ing the message recipient the ability to reply. UDP provides a low overhead 
transportation service which adds little to the service provided by the IP 
module. Importantly, it does not use acknowledgment to ensure messages 
are delivered nor does it reorder message parts which may have arrived out 
of order. UDP adds two services to that provided by IP. One is the multi-
plexing of information between applications based on port number. Second, 
a checksum can be included in each datagram to check for communication 
error and data integrity. 
3.4.2 Transmission Control Protocol 
TCP currently is implemented on a variety of networks. It is designed to 
provide applications with an orderly, reliable transmission service. Since it 
makes few assumptions about the underlying network, it is able to provide a 
reliable end-to-end service over an unreliable network. The rational behind 
TCP is tliat often, applications require an exchange of data and to use a 
transmission system that does not guarantee reliable delivery would require 
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each application to have error detection and recovery built in. The goal of 
TCP is to provide a general purpose solution to a problem that is common 
to a number of applications. 
TCP is able to provide a reliable service by using a technique called positive 
acknowledgment with retransmits. This requires the recipient to acknowledge 
each message it receives. The sender keeps a record of messages that have 
been sent but not acknowledged. The sender also maintains a timer for each 
message so that a retransmission can be made if a message were to be lost. 
Messages are assigned a sequence number so that duplicate messages can 
be detected and discarded. Message sequencing is also used to correctly 
reconstruct message parts that arrive out of sequence. 
3.5 Applications 
Application layer protocols that have been specified for the internet protocols 
suite are numerous. In this section three well-known application protocols 
are described. 
3.5.1 TELNET 
TELNET is a standard application level protocol that is part of the internet 
protocol suite and provides a virtual terminal capability. TELNET allows 
users at one site to establish a TCP connection with a server at remote site. 
By passing key strokes from the local host and displaying the echoes from the 
36 CHAPTER 3. THE INTERNET PROTOCOL SUITE 
remote host, the user is provided with the ability to access remote services 
online. The TELNET protocol includes a mechanism which allows the two 
ends to negotiate various options including data type, screen configuration 
and keyboard configuration. 
TELNET has gained wide acceptance and is widespread. It has been imple-
mented in a large number of operating system environments and provides 
good interoperability. 
3.5.2 File Transfer Protocol 
File Transfer Protocol (FTP), like TELNET, has been implemented under 
a large number of operating systems. It is designed to allow users to copy 
files between local and remote hosts." Even though the user initiates the 
process from the local machijie, files can be transferred in either direction. 
File transfer is only possible after the user has been identified by the remote 
machine which is accomplished by a login process. This process is used by 
the remote operating system to establish the rights the user has over files. 
Communication between the two hosts uses TCP and is essentially over an 
insecure network. 
3.5.3 Remote Commands ' 
The remote command family has been designed to allow a user to execute 
Unix style commands on remote hosts. A number of these remote equivalents 
commands have been created and are available principally on Unix systems. 
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The naming convention used for this family requires the remote command 
name to have the letter "r" placed in in front of the Unix command. That is, 
the Unix copy command "cp" has a remote equivalent "rep" and the Unix 
command "who" has "rwho". 
Remote commands provide a convenient way for user to execute commands 
on a remote host. However, little consideration has been given to security. 
System security is based on a system of trusted hosts. The system admin-
ister chooses a set of hosts that can be trusted. Once a user's identity has 
been established on one host within this defined set, that identity will be 
t 
trusted by all hosts in that set. The user's identity is included in the remote 
command message. 
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Chapter 4 
A Look at internet Protocol 
Suite Security 
Although the internet protocol suite was developed with the aid of spon-
sorship from the United States Department of Defense (commonly referred 
to as DoD), the protocols are in wide use in all manner of environments 
including industrial, commercial and of course the Internet itself. We have 
noted that during its conception and implementation, security was not the 
primary concern. Greater emphasis was placed on issues such as efficiency 
and inter-operability. 
Very little in the way of security services currently exist within the most 
widely used implementations of the protocol suite. The underlying assump-
tion has been that these protocols were modules in a computer operating 
system and access would be gained by the normal file mechanisms. This 
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method of providing secure communication cannot ensure security for two 
reasons. First, in a large internet, it is unreasonable to expect every host to 
be verifyably secure. Second, for a conversation between two principals to 
take place, IP packets must navigate a number of networks. It is unlikely 
that the two communicating principals trust (or even know) the gateways 
involved. 
In this chapter we discuss the need for adding security to the internet pro-
tocol suite by examining some of the "holes" that have been found. The 
approach taken is to show some of the problems that currently exist and' 
t 
thus illustrate the types of issues any security service must address. The 
thrust of this chapter has been kept very informal and has the aim of giving 
the reader a flavor of the issues involved in providing security services. 
4.1 The Adversary 
Before examining some of the current problems, let us quickly profile the 
adversary. It is commonly accepted that the adversary has the power to 
examine, modify and inject packets into internet. This is a reasonable as-
sumption since an internet is made up a number of networks which are 
controUed by autonomous organizations. We can break up the attacks that 
an adversary can launch into six broad categories. 
• By eavesdropping, or monitoring network traffic, an adversary hopes 
to gain some advantage or learn some secret. To avoid this threat all 
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hosts that come in contact with the packet, including gateways, must 
by trusted. If an adversary has access to a host that the IP packet 
must navigate, then monitoring is possible. This could of course occur 
if a host were compromised, however SLS we wiU see, an adversary can 
use other means. 
• A modification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets 
as they travel across the computer network. For such an attack to 
succeed the changes must be undetected. 
• The goal of a replay attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowl-
edge by retransmitting a message that was intercepted earlier. An 
important point to note is that a replay attack can be used against 
protocols which use encryption. The attack may be successful even 
though the adversary is unable to break the underlying cryptographic 
system and has no knowledge of the secret key used. The example 
often quoted to illustrate this is the vulnerability in the Diffie-HeUman 
key exchange [36]. 
• In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of 
the principals in the system. 
• A delay attack is an attempt by an adversary to gain advantage by 
delaying communications betw^een principals. Detection of such an 
attack is important when communications are time critical. 
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• A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary that is 
able to hinder communications is some manner. Detection of such an 
attack is difficult in an internet environment. 
4.2 Address Based Authentication 
Much of the vulnerability of the internet protocol suite is due to a reliance 
on address based authentication. It is common practice to trust the integrity 
of the IP packet header; in particular the source address field is often taken 
i 
to be proof of identity. Since our profile of the adversary enables him (or 
her) to fabricate false messages, this is a flawed practice. 
To illustrate the point consider the manner in which FTP [29] works. A 
FTP client requests TCP to open a connection with the host it specifies. 
The details of the connection is left to TCP. FTP has no mean of verifying 
that the remote server is the one actually requested. When a user login 
prompt is received by the FTP client, the user wiU, with very few exceptions, 
enter the account name and password. The assumption made is that TCP 
has connected to the correct server. There are two points worth noting 
regarding the FTP protocol. One, the server is not chaUenged regarding its 
identity. Two, the server has no means of detecting or countering a replay 
attack. 
TCP identifies the remote server by associating it with a TCP port within 
the local host. That is, the local TCP module assumes that aH data sent 
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through that port are received by the server and all data received from the 
port were sent by the server. In reality TCP trusts the data received from 
the port because it trusts the underlying IP layer. The IP layer in turn relies 
on the address contained in the IP packet header to determine source and 
route. Thus, FTP security relies heavily on the addresses contained in the 
IP packet header, in other words, address based authentication. 
4.3 Source Route Attack 
Included in the IP header is a field called the Optional Field which allows 
certain types of processing to be carried out on the IP packets. Since this 
optional processing is part of the IP specification, all implementation must 
include it. Source Route is one of the options specified. 
Source Route allows the sender of an IP packet to dictate the route to be 
taken. The primary use of this option is made by administrators to test a 
particular network or overcome a temporary difficulty. In [5], an attack is 
described that takes advantage of this mechanism. The attack relies on a 
common practice where the recipient of an IP packet will use the reverse 
of the source route information to transmit the reply. This is of course 
quite reasonable since the sender may wish a particular path be followed to 
overcome technical difficulties such as a failed gateway. For this attack to 
succeed, the adversary requires that a TCP channel be opened via a specified 
routine. To illustrate, consider the network configuration in Figure 4.1. A 
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quick reference to Figure 3.3 may also be of benefit. 
WATTLE EUCALYPT 
3» 
(TARGET) 
SILKY-OAK WARATAH 
G4 G5 G6 
, (ADVERSARY) 
Figure 4.1: Source Route Attack 
In this example WATTLE is the target of the attack and WARATAH is a 
remote host that is trusted by WATTLE. The gateway G4 is part of the open 
network and is under the control of the adversary. The gateways normally 
used by WATTLE and WARATAH to communicate are EUCALYPT, Gl , 
G2, G3 and SILKY-OAK. None of these have been compromised. 
The aim of this attack is for the adversary to be able to masquerade as 
WARATAH. To accomplish this the adversary is going to attempt to trick 
WATTLE into routing the conversation through gateway G4. If successful 
all messages destined for WARATAH wiU be received by the adversary who 
can then fabricate replies as if they originated from WARATAH. Of course 
WARATAH as no knowledge of this exchange. The details of the attack are 
4.4. ROUTINE INFORMATION PROTOCOL ATTACK 45 
as follows. 
1. The adversary fabricates a TCP open message such that the source 
in the IP packet header is WARATAH. The packet also uses the IP 
Source Route option where the route specified passes through gateway 
G4. 
2. WATTLE responds by engaging in the TCP open protocol. It sends 
its own sequence number and acknowledges the previous message. It 
is common practice for the reply to be sent via the reverse of the route 
specified in the first message. If this is done, the message wiU be sent 
via G4 and thus the adversary will be able to intercept it. The attack 
will fail if this common practice where not to be followed. 
3. Assume the common practice is followed. The adversary will be able 
to complete the process and open the TCP channel. The adversary 
will have gained access to aU facilities available to WARATAH. In the 
case where WARATAH is a trusted host, the attack could have serious 
consequences. 
4.4 Rout ine Information Protocol Attack 
Routine Information Protocol (RIP) is very widely used. Its popularity 
stems from its distribution with the Berkeley Unix system. The purpose of 
RIP is to provide dynamic routing services for internet gateways by which 
routine tables are automatically updated. This is achieved by gateways 
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within an internet system exchanging information regarding routing and 
reachability. An interesting fact about RIP is that despite its popularity, 
RIP has been written and is in wide usage without a formal standard [9 . 
There are two types of RIP messages, route messages and messages used 
for debugging.(control tracing). We will only be concerned with the route 
messages in the following discussion. RIP route messages are periodically 
broadcast by gateways to advertise changes in the routing dynamics. These 
unsolicited messages are, typically, trusted by the receiving gateway and 
the information contained is accepted without the sources being verified [5]. 
Essentially another example of address based authentication. 
In sending the message, a gateway informs its peers of the distance between it 
and a specified destination. The distance is measured in "hops" (the number 
of gateways between the two). By creating a false RIP message, an adversary 
can attack the system [5]. Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 4.2 
which shows the distance to WARATAH measured from WATTLE. 
Once again the normal route between WATTLE and WARATAH uses gate-
ways Gl, G2 and 0 3 and the adversary has control of gateway G4. In 
order to intercept messages sent by WATTLE, the adversary fabricates a 
RIP message to Gl which states that gateway G4 is one (1) hop away from 
WARATAH. The RIP message to gateway G5 maintains the correct state; 
that is G4 is four (4) hops away. If successful, traffic from WATTLE will be 
routed through gateway G4 by gateway Gl. The new route will use gate-
ways Gl, G4, G5, G6 and G3 resulting in the adversary gaining control of 
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WATTLE EUCALYPT 
4 HOPS 
OPEN NETWORK 
SILKY-OAK WARATAH 
Gl G2 G3 
3 HOPS 2 HOPS IHOP 
G4 G5 G6 
OHOPS 
4 HOPS 3 HOP 2 HOPS 
Figure 4.2: Routine Information Protocol Attacks 
the communication channel by manipulating the RIP protocol. The adver-
sary would not only be able to monitor traffic but also launch a masquerade 
attack similar to that described in Section 4.3. 
4.5 ICMP Vulnerabilities 
The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is fundamental to the way IP 
functions. Its role is to provide a mechanism by which a sender of a message 
can be informed of problems that are detected by the recipient or one of 
the intervening gateways. Commonly these messages are sent as a result of 
some change in the internet network such as a change in the configuration 
48CHAPTER 4. A LOOK AT INTERNET PROTOCOL SUITE SECURITY 
or a failure. The ICMP messages are designed to inform the sender so that 
it can modify its behavior in order to avoid the detected problem. In this 
section we will examine two of these message types which offer a potential 
for abuse. 
4.5.1 Redirect Message 
Under normal conditions an individual host's route table changes infre-
quently. Changes are only required if there are changes to the local network 
or failure of a local gateway. As gateways exchange route information reg-
ularly, their routine information is Ukely to be correct. The ICIP Redirect 
message is used by gateways to advise the sender of a better route and con-
tains the IP header and the first sixty four bit of the original message. This 
is to enable the sender to identify the particular message concerned. On 
receiving the Redirect message, the host (that is the sender of the original 
message) makes a change to its route table, which enables the next message 
to take advantage of the more optimum route. 
An adversary may be able to take advantage of this mechanism by havirig 
the message directed through an insecure host. The attack is made slightly 
more difficult by the fact that a Redirect message must tied to a particular 
connection and only the primary gateway (the first gateway) can send the 
Redirect message. 
The method used in the following attack is quite simple and was suggest in 
5]. Consider, an adversary has control of BOTTLEBRUSH (see Figure 3.3) 
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and wishes to intercept messages sent by WATTLE to WARATAH. The 
steps that would be taken by the adversary in this attempt are as follows: 
1. The adversary waits until WARATAH is unreachable for some reason, 
say scheduled maintenance. The adversary then sends a TCP open 
request to WATTLE, claiming to be WARATAH. This is a matter of 
constructing the message with a false IP header such that the source 
address is WARATAH's. 
2. WATTLE responds by a engaging in the TCP open sequence. This 
1 
message will of course be routed through EUCALYPT which has not 
been compromised. 
3. While the message is en route, the adversary sends a Redirect message 
claiming to be EUCALYPT. Since the ICIP Redirect message is tied 
to a connection it appears to be genuine and WATTLE is likely to 
modify its route table without further validation. Apart for the syn-
chronization message that has been lost by the adversary, all further 
messages would be routed through BOTTLEBRUSH. 
To succeed, the adversary relies on WATTLE not performing an adequate 
amount of validation on the ICMP Redirect messages it receives. If successful 
the adversary will control the channel and thus have the ability to masquer-
ade as WARATAH. Depending on the IP implementation, the change to 
the route tables may last for some time in which case the adversary can 
monitor and even modify messages sent by WATTLE to WARATAH. The 
50CHAPTER 4. A LOOK AT INTERNET PROTOCOL SUITE SECURITY 
attack once again did not require the adversary to break-in to any machine. 
The attack would also mean that the adversary may have access to infor-
mation that is protected by authentication mechanisms at the application 
layer. This information may not have been available by simply breaking-in 
to a single user's account. 
4.5.2 Destination Unreachable Message 
ICMP may also be used for targeted denial of service attack. Several of 
its messages such as Destination Unreachable and Time Exceeded may be 
i 
used to reset existing connections. If the adversary knows the local and 
remote port number of a TCP connection, an ICMP packet aimed at that 
connection can be forged. Such information is sometimes available through 
netstat service. 
4.6 TCP Sequence Number Prediction Attack 
Before discussing the security weakness described by Morris in [23] let us 
briefly recap the way in which TCP connections are established. Every TCP 
message has a sequence number. This is so that duplicate messages can 
be detected and discarded. Message sequencing is also used to correctly 
reconstruct message parts that may arrive out of sequence. 
For WATTLE and WARATAH to estabUsh a connection, the TCP mod-
ules on both machines must engage in a protocol known as a three-way 
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handshake [9]. A primary function of this exchange is for the two machines 
to synchronize sequence numbers. The method used is quite simple, each 
machine informs the other of the sequence number to be used. On every 
subsequent message the sequence number is increased. The steps involved 
in this handshake a.re as follows. WATTLE is the initiator. 
1. WATTLE requests a connection with WARATAH by sending the first 
message in this three step exchange. WATTLE sets the synchroniza-
tion bit in the message in order to indicate to WARATAH that this 
is an attempt to open a communications channel. The message eon-
tains a sequence number which WATTLE wishes WARATAH to use 
in messages it sends as part of this conversation message (see 3.4.2). 
2. WARATAH responds by sending its own sequence number and ac-
knowledging the message from WATTLE. 
3. WATTLE completes the sequence by acknowledging WARATAH's mes-
sage. 
In Berkeley Unix, every host increases the sequence number it will use for the 
next connection, each second by a constant amount and half that amount 
each time a connection is initiated. This is to ensure that sequence numbers 
are not repeated for existing connections. 
Suppose that WARATAH is a trusted machine and that the adversary has 
control of BOTTLEBRUSH which is not trusted. Further suppose WATTLE 
and WARATAH communicate at regular intervals. Morris pointed out that 
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if the adversary is able to predict the sequence number used by WARATAH 
during a conversation, then it is possible to inject a message. It is not 
necessary for the adversary to receive the traffic between WARATAH and 
WATTLE. Such a attack could be devastating if the adversary was allowed 
to execute malicious commands; for instance using the Berkeley's remote 
shell. 
To predict the sequence number the adversary initiates a connection with 
the sole purpose of discovering the current sequence number. In this case 
BOTTLEBRUSH initiates a connection with WARATAH. Having obtained 
i 
the sequence number and having knowledge of how the sequence numbers 
are incremented, the adversary can predict, with a high degree of confidence, 
the sequence number that will be used on the next connection. 
Chapter 5 
Communication Security 
In the previous chapter we took an informal look at some security issues 
that are faced by administrators of a great many systems within the Internet 
community. In this chapter we will discuss issues related to mechanisms and 
services that can be used to implement security. 
In an at tempt to provide security within the internet protocol suite, we must 
consider two fundamental questions: 
• What are the communication security services that would be required 
to allow users to communicate securely? 
• What mechanisms are available to provide these? 
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5.1 Communication Security 
Before the advent of the workstation, computing services were provided by 
large centralized time share machines. In such an environment, the operating 
system was responsible for protecting users from each other and controlling 
access to shared resources. Each user was required to prove his (or her) 
identity to the computer system by a login process. This identity formed 
the basis by which the rights and privileges of a given user were determined. 
Data security and integrity remained the sole responsibility of the individual 
operating system. . 
More recently, there has been a move away from the centralized approach 
to one where resources are distributed over a number of computer systems. 
Users within a distributed system may require services from various com-
puters, these may be geographically separated. The issue of data security 
and integrity is often made more difficult by having computers within the 
distributed system such that, the network administrator cannot guarantee 
that proper access control mechanisms are in place. The two most common 
reasons for such a occurrence are: first, the distributed system includes com-
puters whose access control mechanisms can be circumvented. The inclusion 
of personal computers within a distributed system is commonly quoted as 
an example of this type of problem. Second, access has been given to com-
puters that are outside the organization's direct control. This of course is a 
common.problem within the Internet community. 
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The need for adequate security services for networks that use the internet 
protocol suite remains largely unsatisfied. The networks themselves are vul-
nerable to various types of attacks. There is no systematic provision for 
protecting the confidentiality of user communications and in many cases it 
is comparatively easy for intruders to intercept, understand, alter commu-
nications, or even originate forgeries. Since there is no standard effective 
method for the authentication of network principals, the Internet provides 
an excellent vehicle for allowing the criminal to remain anonymous while 
committing theft or acts of vandalism. 
5.2 Security Services 
For principals to communicate securely within a distributed system, three 
basic services are required [13]. These are: 
• Authentication. Informally, authentication is the capability of the re-
cipient of a communication to be able to verify that the message did 
come from the alleged sender. It is often the case that the recipient 
of a message will trust the sender's identity contained in the message. 
However, without proper authentication, it would not be possible to 
prove this identity to a third party. 
• Privacy. Refers to the protection of information against interception 
of individual IP packets. It is worth making the distinction between 
privacy and transmission security. That is, even if an adversary is pre-
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vented from discovering the content of any individual message, valuable 
deductions can be made by examining the time, length and distribution 
of various messages. Measures to prevent an opponent from studying 
the overall flow of communication are called transmission security [12 
Integrity. Refers to protection data against manipulation. 
In [13] Nechvatel suggested a fourth service called nonrepudiation, that 
could be included in the list of basic services. Nonrepudiation would protect 
the sender against denial of the message being received. A system of receipts 
could be implemented to provide this service. However, it is worth noting 
that a receipt itself is a message which, if it is to be believed, must rely on the 
three basic services listed above. Also, receipts add to the cost of conducting 
a conversation and it may not be necessary for a receipt to be produced for 
every message. Thus the choice of whether receipts are necessary should be 
left to an exchange protocol. 
5.3 Delivery of Security Services 
Link Security is one of two approaches by which security services can be 
delivered [13]. In a network protected by Hnk security, encryption is placed 
low in the protocol suite stack, either as part of the Physical layer (ISO level 
1) or the Data Link layer (ISO level 2). This approach requires that aU traffic 
be enciphered before transmission over the network and deciphered by the 
receiving host. Link encryption provides good protection against external 
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threats sucli as traffic analysis, since the entire packet, including the IP and 
TCP headers, is encrypted. Encryption is usually implemented with the 
aid of hardware and thus link security can be readily incorporated into an 
existing network. 
However, link encryption has a major disadvantage: since the entire message 
is enciphered, every en route gateway must decipher each packet in order to 
be able to route. A message may have to be encrypted and decrypted several 
times before it is finally delivered. In addition to increasing the burden on 
the network, if a gateway is compromised then all traffic flowing through 
I 
that gateway is also compromised. Further, link encryption requires the use 
of a common algorithm and that all gateways within the network be trusted 
with a key which can decipher all messages. Such an agreement is highly 
unlikely in a open network environment such as the Internet, where control 
is not exercised by a single organization. 
The second method of providing security is called end-to-end security which 
requires that the security services be provided above the Transport layer [13 . 
In this method a message is encrypted and decrypted only at the end points, 
thereby largely circumventing the problems due to compromised intervening 
gateways. End-to-end security has two advantages which make it attractive 
for a implementation within a network like the Internet. First, encryption 
above TCP level can secure any conversation between source and destination 
systems, regardless of the number of hops or quality of link [5]. Second, 
implementation would not require changing the manner in which TCP or IP 
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function. The change could be limited to hosts that are participating in the 
conversation. In other words, the Internet would not be expected to provide 
any security, but simply be a conduit for secure communications. 
For end-to-end security to work, addressing information (IP and TCP head-
ers) must be left in plaintext (not encrypted). This is to allow gateways to 
route packets which would make the system vulnerable to traffic analysis. 
However, for most environments this is probably an acceptable compromise 
between security and practical considerations. 
i 
5.4 Security Mechanisms 
The security service that are essential for secure communication rely on 
certain cryptographic primitives for their implementation. In [13] primitive 
services are grouped thus: 
• Encryption which can be used to ensure privacy. 
• Digital Signatures which are useful in authentication schemes. 
• Manipulation Detection Codes used to guard against data manipula-
tion. 
Many such cryptographic systems have been designed and are available. For 
the purpose of our discussions the system's cryptographic requirements can 
be simplified and kept generic. In the following discussion the choice to use a 
public key cryptographic system has been made because of the improvements 
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in the security of key management and its ability to provide digital signatures 
12, 36, 13]. 
5.4.1 Encryption 
Data confidentially service provides a way to prevent information from being 
disclosed by transforming plaintext into cipher-text. In using cryptographic 
systems to provide privacy, either public key (eg. [45, 33]) or conventional 
cryptographic-system (eg. [8, 1]) can by used. A public key system dif-
fers from a secret key (or symmetric) system in that each principal in the 
t 
distributed system has a pair of keys. The calculation of this private and 
public key pair, given the initial conditions, is easy. However, it would be 
infeasible for an adversary who knows a public key to calculate the secret 
key or the initial conditions. Each principal has a private key which is kept 
secret and is only known to that principal. The corresponding public key 
is made available to all other principals. In the remainder of this document 
means encipher with key Z. The private and pubhc key pair wiU be 
denoted as "X" and "Y" respectively and subscripts will be used to identify 
the associated principal. Thus, the principal, Alice, would have the pair 
XaiYa while Bob would have Xb^Yb-
The advantage of a public key system is that it supports secrecy, authenti-
cation, and integrity. Communication secrecy is supported by the transfor-
mations [36]: 
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M = {{M}y^}X^ (5.1) 
That is, suppose Alice wishes send a secret message, M, to Bob. Then Alice 
must have access Bob's public key and encipher the message, thus: 
C = {M}y^ (5.2) 
Alice sends Bob the cryptographic string C. On receipt Bob is able to employ 
his private key to decipher the message. 
{C}Xs = {{M}Y^}Xn=M (5.3) 
The encryption and decryption processes are easy using the appropriate keys. 
However, it would be infeasible for an adversary to decipher C without the 
private key Xb, ensuring secrecy. Now, since Yb is publicly known, Bob has 
no way of being certain of the sender's identity. Thus authenticity has not 
been assured using this method. 
5.4.2 Authentication 
Authentication, using a pubhc key system, is satisfied by the following trans-
formation [361. 
M = (5.4) 
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Alice is able to "sign" her message to Bob by using her private key, Xa' 
C = {M}x, (5.5) 
Bob is able to verify that the message could have only come from Alice by 
deciphering the message using Alice's public key, thus: 
{C}y^ = = M (5.6) 
5.4.3 Manipulation Detect ion Code 
If the message, M, is plaintext, Bob knows that C has in fact not been 
altered. However, if the message, or any portion of the message, has a 
random string then it may be difficult for Bob to ascertain that the message 
has not been altered merely by examining it [13]. For this reason it is more 
usual for Alice to employ a suitable one-way hashing function (eg. [32, 44]) 
to produce a Manipulation Detection Code (MDC) [36]. Alice would sign 
the MDC with her private key and append it to the message. On receiving 
the message. Bob is able to reproduce the MDC in order to confirm that the 
message is from Alice and that it has not been altered. Finally, all three can 
be employed by Alice to communicate securely with Bob thus: 
C = {M,{MDC}X^}ys (5-7) 
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Chapter 6 
Authentication and Key 
Distribution Systems 
Currently, the dominant authentication and key distribution protocols em-
ployed in a client-server environments use a broker to arbitrate between 
principals who wish to communicate. In such a scheme the broker is usually 
referred to as the authentication server (AS). A principal must first contact 
the AS to obtain credentials which can be trusted by its communicating 
partner. The protocol will typically rely on an exchange of cryptographic 
messages and the participants knowledge of some secret. Well-known exam-
ples of such systems are Kerberos [40, 19, 4, 20], SPX [42], KryptoKnight 
22] and more recently Kuperee [15]. 
In this chapter we will describe two very well-known implementations. The 
first of these called Kerberos, was designed for and is currently used in, 
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a number of internet environments. KryptoKniglit, the second illustrative 
example, is a more recent development and will probably be seen in the 
future at a number of sites within the Internet. 
6.1 Principals and Realms 
The use of the terms principal and realm has become conventional within 
the area of secure communications and their meaning has remained fairly 
consistent for quite sometime. It is however worth stating the use of these 
terms in the context of this document and so avoid difficulties caused by 
them being new to some readers or used differently elsewhere. 
All communicating network entities are referred to as principals. This group 
is further subdivided into three: 
• The user is the human being who is using some services that are pro-
vided by the network. All programs in the system are initiated by 
users. The main purpose of authentication is to verify the identity of 
the users within a network. 
• A client is a program that runs on behalf of a user in order to request 
some service on a remote host. Since the client runs on a user's behalf, 
it assumes the user identity and privileges. Any action taken by a 
client is said to have been carried out by the user. Notice that there 
is-an investment of trust being made by the user. That is, the user 
IS assuming that the client software has been correctly implemented 
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and that it will perform its stated function properly. A Trojan Horse 
would prove disastrous. 
• The server is a program that provides a service to a client on the 
network. It is usually installed by the system administrator and runs 
on behalf of the system. A server remains active in a network for 
much longer than a client and thus is given its own identity. By this, 
it is meant, that similarly to users, each server is registered with the 
authentication server and must prove its identity before a client will 
accept it. 
t 
A realm in terms of a third-party authentication system is organized in a 
hierarchical structure and has a strong analogy to a domain in the Internet. 
A single Authentication Server (AS) is responsible for all local principals 
that are registered with it. This collection of network entities, the AS and its 
clients, are referred to as a realm. A client who wishes to obtain some service 
for a server within the same realm would first need to obtain a credential 
from the AS. These credentials, which are in the form of tickets, are discussed 
in some detail later in this chapter. For the moment it is enough to say that, 
a client is able to prove its identity to a server by presenting a ticket. The 
ticket having been issued to the client by the AS for that server. 
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6.2 Kerberos 
Kerberos [19, 40] is one of the best known efforts to provide an authentication 
service and was developed at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
as part of Project Athena [4]. It is based on the well-known Needham and 
Schroeder scheme [24] and incorporates modifications that were proposed by 
Denning and Sacco [11 . 
Kerberos shares a private encryption key with each of its clients. These 
shared keys are used to construct credentials that will convince one principal 
that the identity of another is genuine. To establish this level of trust between 
principals, Kerberos must have the trust of all principals within its realm. 
The description of Kerberos that foUows has been greatly simplified. Addi-
tional fields are present in the tickets, authenticators, and messages. Some 
additional functionality, including renewable and forwardable tickets, are 
supported in Kerberos Version 5. For a more rigorous presentation of these, 
the reader is referred to [20]. Additional information on software releases, 
both free and supported, can be found in [17]. 
6.2.1 Pre-authentication 
Kerberos offers two services to its clients, pre-authentication which is per-
formed by Key Distribution Centre (KDC) and Ticket Generation which is. 
performed by the Ticket-Granting Server (TGS). A request to the KDC is 
usually initiated by a client who wishes to obtain authentication credentials 
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but currently holds none. Typically, this exchange occurs when the user 
initially logs in to the network. The secret key which is shared by the user 
and the KDC is used for encryption and decryption of all messages between 
the two principals. At the end of the exchange, assuming it is successful, 
the client obtains credentials that will be acceptable to the TGS and a ran-
domly generated session key. Subsequently all exchanges between the client 
and the TGS wiU use this session key and not the user's secret key. The 
prime purpose of this pre-authentication exchange is to minimize the chance 
that client's secret key will be compromised. This pre-authentication process 
is illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
AUTHENTICATION SERVER 
CLIENT SERVER 
Figure 6.1: Kerberos Pre-Authentication 
1. Client KDC: c,TGS 
The client sends a message to the KDC requesting credentials for the 
named server. Normally the request names the TGS, as is the case in 
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this example. However, some services such as "change user password" 
require credentials from the KDC. 
The requesting message sent by the client, which is in plaintext, con-
tains its own identity (c) and the identity of the server (TGS). The 
credentials obtained will only be enciphered so that they are only use-
ful to the named principals. 
2. KDC ^ Client: {T , , tgs .Kc , tgs}k . 
The KDC responds with the requested credentials encrypted in the 
client's secret key. The credentials consist of: 
• A ticket, Tc,tgs, for the server. The ticket format is explained in 
Section 6.2.3. 
• A temporary encryption key, often called a session key, Kc,TGS-
This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance that the request was 
from the client named, c. The KDC simply relies on the secret key that is 
known only by itself and the named client who is acting on the users behalf. 
No one else should be able to decipher the reply. 
6.2.2 Obtaining Service Credentials 
At the end of the pre-authentication exchange the client wiU have obtained 
credentials which are acceptable only to the TGS and have a finite Hfetime. 
The client is required to re-apply at the end of this period. In the event that 
the client wishes to obtain service from some server on the network, it is 
6.2. KERBEROS 69 
necessary for it to obtain additional credentials. Credentials for individual 
servers are issued by the TGS as illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
AUTHENTICATION SERVER 
CUE SERVER 
Figure 6.2: Kerberos Obtaining Service Credentials 
1. Cl ient T G S : S,TC,TGS, AC^TGS 
The client transmits to the TGS a request for credentials for server s. 
The message contains two other components in addition to the servers 
name, 5: 
The ticket, TC,TGS is enciphered with the secret key which the 
TGS shares with the KDC. The ticket contains the client's iden-
tity, c, and a copy of the session key Kc,TGS-
The session key, KC,TGS-> which will be shared by the client and 
TGS is used to authenticate the client. The authenticator, AC,TGS^ 
is constructed by the client and enciphered with the session key. 
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Since knowledge of the session key is limited to the three partici-
pants, the TGS can be sure of the client's identity. 
2. TGS ^ Ghent: 
The TGS deciphers and validates the credentials presented by the 
chent. If they are acceptable, the TGS will generate a session key 
to be used by the chent and the server together with credentials that 
will be acceptable to the server. The main difference between these 
credentials and those obtained by the chent in the pre-authentication 
phase is that tickets issued by the TGS have a shorter hfe. 
3. Client =i> Server: 
Having obtained credentials from the TGS, the chent is able to present 
these to the server as a means of initiating a conversation. Once again 
the format of the message components is similar to that in step one. 
4. Server =i> Ghent: {timestamp ^ 
Optionally, the chent may require proof of the server's identity. In such 
a case the server must extract the timestamp from the ticket, modify 
it, and return it to the chent enciphered with the session key. Note 
that the timestamp is modified by increasing its value by one. Since 
the session key is only known to the participants, the server is able to 
prove its identity. 
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6.2.3 Credentials 
Within the Kerberos authentication system credentials are used to prove 
the identity of one principal to an other. There are two types of credentials 
which fulfill different requirements. A ticket is issued to a client and is used 
to securely pass information from the issuing authority to the server. Notice 
the ticket is not issued to the server directly, but is presented by the client 
as part of its credentials. The ticket has the following format: 
{5, c, addr, timestamp, life, Kc,s}ks 
where: 
addr 
timestamp 
life 
C,5 
K. 
the name of the server. 
the name of the client to whom the ticket was issued, 
the client's IP address. 
the time at which the ticket was issued. This field 
ensures that the ticket is current. 
the ticket's life. That is the period after which the 
ticket will not be valid. 
the session key. 
the server's secret key. This key is known only to the server and 
the issuing authority and is used to encipher the ticket. 
The second type of credential is the authenticator. This is used to prove 
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tha t the client presenting the ticket is the legitimate owner. Unlike the 
ticket, the authenticator is freslily constructed by the client. The form of 
the authenticator is as follows: 
{c, addr, time}K^, 
where: 
c the 
addr the 
time the 
the 
The authenticator is transmitted to the server together with the ticket. The 
server is able to believe the client's identity because of its knowledge of the 
session key. 
6.2.4 Limitations 
Kerberos is probably the most used of the authentication systems. It has 
been incorporated into a number of architectures and commercial offerings. 
In spite of its popularity Kerberos suffers from a number of limitations. In 
this section we will discuss three of the weaknesses pointed out in [6]. For a 
full account the reader is referred to the original paper. 
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Replay Attack 
Within Kerberos time stamps are used to insure that the credentials pre-
sented by a principal are fresh (see 6.2.3). To initiate a conversation a client 
presents two types of credentials, a ticket which has been issued by a trust 
authority and a freshly generated authenticator. Typically the authenticator 
has a life of five minutes. 
Consider the following scenario. An adversary in monitoring the local net-
work wait for a "mail check session". That is a principal login into the 
system in order to deal with a few items of electronic mail, before logging 
out. Within that short time the user has unwittingly exposed a number of 
valuable credentials that may have recorded and could be replayed. Even 
if the session key has not been compromised, the protocol is exposed to 
a replay attack. Further, the adversary may be able to generate valuable 
encrypted data for "cracking" off-line. 
Time Synchronization 
Kerberos relies quite heavily on hosts within a realm having synchronized 
clocks. If a host is misled about the correct time, replay of stolen credentials 
becomes a real danger. There is an in-built assumption within Kerberos 
that an authenticated synchronization protocol is being used. It has to be 
stressed that a number of commonly used synchronization protocols do not 
include adequate security. As Kerberos is being consider for use in more 
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varied environments, this is likely to be more problematic. 
Session Key Exposure 
The term "session key" is some what misused within the Kerberos system. 
The key is contained within a ticket and may be used by the client, multiple 
times, to obtain service from the same server. The reasoning behind this is; 
system load can be lessened by reducing the number of messages required 
for two principals to start a conversation and the involvement of the au-
thentication servers. That is, since tickets can only be manufactured by an 
authentication server, if the ticket were to be used only once, the authentica-
tion would have to be involved in initiating every conversation. The multiple 
use of session keys does increase the system's exposure to cryptanalysis 
6.3 KryptoKnight 
KryptoKnight was jointly developed by IBM Zürich and Yorktown Research 
Laboratories. Like Kerberos, KryptoKnight provides a third party authen-
tication service using secret key encryption. The authentication server (AS) 
keeps a database on all principals under its dominion. The stated goal of 
KryptoKnight [22] is to provide authentication and key distribution services 
to users and program. Toward this goal KryptoKnight offers four services: 
1. Single Sign-On (SSO); 
2. Two-party Authentication; 
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3. Key Distribution; 
4. Authentication of origin and content of data. 
6.3.1 KryptoKnight Encryption Method 
KryptoKnight has been impleniented at IBM Zürich Research Laboratory 
and a one of its design goals was the exportability of the protocol. Thus 
the KryptoKnight protocol does not make use of date encryption in the 
manner used by Kerberos. Instead it makes heavy use of keyed one-way 
hash functions based on DES [1] or LOKI [8]. The output is a 64 bit hash 
of the message. The message text can be of any length. 
KM AC KM = KMAC{MESSAGE}K M 
Notice that the KMAC uses a block cipher and the output is dependent 
on both the message and the key KM- Thus, this method can be used to 
authenticate the recipient since knowledge of the secret key, A'jv/, is required. 
Where secrecy is absolutely necessary, which is the case in key distribution, 
modulo two arithmetic used in the following manner. 
token = KMACkm ® ^'^s 
The token is transmitted and a random, 64 bit session key, A'5, is is gener-
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ated. To recover Ks, requires the recreation oiKMACR-j^. In KryptoKnight 
the message used to create KMACkm ^̂  Publicly known thus the intended 
recipient of the token must know Km which is a secret. 
6.3.2 KryptoKnight Ticket 
As stated previously the KryptoKnight authentication system is based on 
sharing of secret keys between the AS and each principal. When two princi-
pals wish to communicate, they must obtain a secret, key that they can share 
(a so called session key). Usually the initiator of the communication applies 
to the AS for a ticket which contains the session key. As in Kerberos, the 
ticket is encrypted in a way such that the session key can be obtained by 
the two communicating principals and no one else. The encryption method, 
however, does differ, see Section 6.3.1. 
The ticket consists of a number of clear text fields and an encrypted token. 
In the following ticket field summary, the client, c, is the principal applying 
for the ticket. The server, s, is the third party with whom the client wishes 
to converse. The AS is the ticket issuing authority and the ticket is being 
issued for the client. We can summarize the principals involved and their 
roles thus: 
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Ticket Reader 
Ticket Issuer 
Third Party 
Client c. 
The Authentication Server AS. 
Server s. 
The protocol used to obtain the ticket is described in Section 6.3.4. The 
ticket format is: 
where: 
Nr, Ni, s, time, token 
Nr 
Ni 
time 
token 
A 64 bit nonce generated by the client. 
A 64 bit nonce generated by the AS. This nonce is 
created using a keyed one-way function and using Ni 
as its input. 
Name of the third party, in this case the server. 
The time after which the ticket is no longer valid. That 
is the ticket expiration time. 
64 bit encrypted token which contains the following: 
where: 
KM AC {Ni ® 5, Nr, Ni ® time}^^^^ ® K^,, 
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KAS,C The reader's key is the secret key shared between the 
client and the AS; 
K^ ̂  The session key which will be shared by the client and 
the server. 
To recover the session key requires knowledge of the secret key KAS,C 
6.3.3 Single Sign-On 
t 
The KryptoKnight system requires the user to login to the network in a 
similar fashion to time share machines. The purpose of the initial exchange 
is to perform a uniform, network wide login of the user (see Figure 6.3). In 
Kerberos this pre-authentication function is fulfilled by the initial exchange 
between the user and the KDC. The procedure in the KryptoKnight is very 
similar and can be summarized as follows. 
1. c AS: u 
The user informs the authentication server, AS, of his (or her) desire 
to login. The client, of course, is acting on the user's behalf. The 
message consists of only the user's name (u) and is sent in plaintext. 
2. c: T.^TAS 
The AS reply, which contains two tickets, is essentially designed to 
distribute a session key to be used by the AS and the client. Knowledge 
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A U T H E N T I C A T I O N S E R V E R 
C U E N T S E R V E R 
Figure 6.3: KryptoKnight Single Sign-On Protocol 
of this session key would subsequently be taken as proof of identity. 
Tc is designed to be read by the client and contains the client's copy 
of the session key. The ticket's content can be summarized thus (refer 
to Section 6.3.2): 
Ticket Reader ^ Client c; 
Ticket Issuer —̂  The Authentication Server AS; 
Third Party The Authentication Server AS; 
Reader's Key A'̂ . The key shared by the client and AS; 
Session Key ^ Kc,as- TO be used by the client and AS. 
The second ticket, Tas, is stored by the client and is sent to the AS 
each time client wishes to converse with the AS. The ticket contents is 
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as follows: 
Ticket Reader The Authentication Server AS; 
Ticket Issuer The Authentication Server AS; 
Third Party The user; 
Reader's Key Kas- The key shared by the client and AS; 
Session Key ^ Kc,AS- To be used by the client and AS. 
The ticket obtained by the user is subsequently used to run process on his 
(or her) behalf. 
6.3.4 Obtaining Service 
Once the user has successfully completed the login process, he (or she) may 
wish to obtain some service. To initiate a communication with a server (or 
any other network entity), the user must obtain a ticket for that server. In 
this section we describe the steps required for a client to initiate such a con-
versation. In doing so the client will be required to use both the Two Party 
Authentication and Key Distribution services from the AS. The process is 
illustrated in Figure 6.4. 
1. clients server: u^Nc,Tc 
The client requests service by presenting its users name, w, and the 
freshly generated nonce Nc. The ticket T^ was obtained during the user 
$ 
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CLIENT 
AUTHENTICATION SERVER 
SERVER 
Figure 6.4: KryptoKnight - Obtaining Service. 
pre-authentication process and will be required by the AS to extract 
the session key it shares with the client. This message initiates the 
authentication and key distribution process. Section 6.3.3 explains the 
pre-authentication process. 
2. servers AS: u, Ns.T^ 
The server generates its own nonce, Ns and forwards it together with 
its name, its ticket, T^, and the information it received from the 
client to the AS. The ticket, was obtained by the server during its 
pre-authentication process which is similar to that under gone by the 
user. Once again the ticket, T^, is required to allow the AS to identify 
the server and extract the key that it shares with the server. 
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3. AS server: Tc,s,Ts,c, NAS 
The AS uses the nonce to generate two tickets, one for the server, Tg^c 
and the other to be forwarded to the client Tc,s- These are returned 
to the server together with a nonce,iV^5 generated by AS. T h e two 
tickets contain the same random session key which the A S generated. 
The tickets are enciphered so that only the intended principal can 
extract the session key. 
4 . server => client: T^T^, NAS, Ns, KMACcs{Nc, N^, Nc ® s) 
The server sends the client á message in two parts: 
• t 
• TC,T,,Nas 
The first three fields are part of the key distribution protocol. 
The server forwards the tickets and the nonce to the client. 
• KMACcsiNc, N,, N^ 0 server) 
The remaining fields are part of the authentication protocol. T h e 
server is able to decipher its own ticket using the key it shares 
with AS. It then uses the session key contained in the ticket 
as the key in the K M A C function. It sends the result together 
with, Ns, the nonce it generated earlier. This second message 
component is to prove the server's identity, since only the server 
could have extracted the session key. 
5 . client server: KMACCS{NC, NS), KMACC{NC, NAS) 
The client uses the key it shares with the authentication server to 
decipher the ticket's contents. If the server's identity is acceptable, 
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the client sends a message to prove its identity. The first component 
of the message is an authenticator for the server. The server will be 
able to accept the client's claim as the KMAC requires knowledge of 
the session key. 
The second message component is created for the server to forward 
to the AS on the client's behalf. It uses the secret key shared by 
the client and the AS and is to confirm the chent's completion of the 
authentication process. 
6. server ^ AS: KMACDNC, NAS). KMACS{NS. NAS) • 
The server, after it has confirmed the client's identity, constructs a 
authenticator for the AS. This final exchange confirms to the AS the 
both parties have received the session key and have authenticated each 
other. 
6.3.5 Observat ions on KryptoKnight 
KryptoKnight is fairly recent compared with Kerberos, hence very little 
work has been done on its analysis. However we can make the foUowing 
observation. 
Message Integrity 
In Section 5.4.3 we explained the use of a one-way hash function to ensure 
data integrity. Briefly, if two principals are communicating, then encryption 
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can be used to ensure privacy. However, if the message contains a random 
portion then it is not possible for tlie recipient to be sure of message integrity,, 
merely by examining it. 
Within the KryptoKnight a key distribution ticket consists of a number of 
clear-text fields and an encrypted token. The token is used to hide the 
session key thus: 
token = K M AC Km{cleartextf ields) ® Kg 
i 
where Kg is 64 bits in length and has been selected to be random. The 
KM AC appears random but is calculated using clear-text fields and the 
recipients secret key. To recover the session key the intended recipient is 
expected to recreate the KMAC field. However, if an adversary were to 
change the ticket's expiration time field, a false key will be recovered. The 
recipient has no way of checking the key's integrity. Thus, the recipient is 
left with no option but to proceed with the protocol and assume the key is 
correct. This weakness in the protocol can be eliminated by the inclusion of 
a MDC as suggested in section 5.4.3. 
Chapter 7 
Beacons 
The use of a Beacon as a security service within a distributed computer 
system was first suggested by M. Rabin [30] in 1983. Rabin's novel ideas on 
the use of Beacons have been largely overlooked by the research community 
during the past decade. In this chapter we wish to revive these ideas in order 
to apply them to the problems of communication security. In the following 
section we will briefly describe Rabin's idea to place Beacons in their proper 
historical prospective. In the sections that foUow we will modify Rabin's 
ideas so that the Beacon may be used to provides a new security service for 
communicating principals. 
This chapter is included in the paper: 
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Beacon based authentication. In Pro-
ceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ES-
ORICS'94), Brighton, UK, Nov 1994, accepted for publication by Lecture 
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Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelb erg-New York, 
1994. 
7.1 Rabin's Approach Using Beacons 
Rabin defined a Beacon as emitting, at regular interval, a random integer 
sealed using a suitable cryptographic signature system. The integer would be 
selected randomly and uniformly within the range 1 to N, where N is publicly 
known. With this basic concept he proposed two probabilistic protocols, one 
for the signing of contracts and the second for information disclosure. In the 
following section Rabin's use of Beacons is illustrated by briefly outlining 
the contract signing protocol. For a full account, the reader is referred to 
the original paper. 
7.1.1 The Contract Signing Problem 
Suppose, Alice is selling her house and Bob is interested in purchasing it. 
They have negotiated a contract over a computer network and are ready to 
exchange signed copies. It is not possible for them to meet and they wish 
to exchange contracts electronically using the network. We can assume that 
the contracts can be signed by an suitable electronic signature scheme. 
The problem addressed by Rabin was, if Alice signs and sends the contract 
to Bob, then Alice is committed, but Bob is not. Bob could take the oppor-
tunity to look for a better deal, leaving Alice vulnerable. A similar argument 
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can be made about Bob. 
7.1.2 Contract Signing Using a Beacon 
In Rabin's protocol we can assume the following initial conditions: 
• Each of the participants has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair 
which can be used for signing messages and verifying signatures. The 
Beacon has the private and public key pair XBJSJ.YBN-, Alice's keys are 
^ A I Y A «i-nd Bob's are XBIYQ. The public keys, YQN-, YA ^ND ^B ARE 
widely known and are available to the participants. Each participant's 
private keys has been kept secret and known only to its owner. 
• The Beacon broadcasts a token, T, every A seconds and the next 
broadcast will be at time i + A. The T has the following form: 
T = {t,i}x BN 
where t is the time at which the token was emitted and i is a randomly 
selected integer between 1 and iV. The value of N is publicly known. 
The Beacon seals the token using its private key XBN-
Alice and Bob have agreed to the contract name, C, such that: 
C = h{contract) 
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where a suitable hash function h is applied to the text of the contract 
and the obtained result is used to denote the contract. 
• Alice and Bob have agreed and signed preliminary agreements. We 
will refer to these agreements signed by Alice and Bob as Pa and P^ 
respectively. The text of Pa is as follows: 
{ If Bob can produce (C, T) signed by Alice and T signed by the Beacon 
for some token T, then I, Alice will be committed to the contract as of 
the time t mentioned in the token T. 
Bob signs a similar contract with the name Alice and Bob exchanged. 
Since this agreement does not bind either parties to the contract, it 
reasonable to assume that this initial exchange will pass off without 
incident. 
The protocol for the exchange of contracts requires that both parties follow 
a timed sequence. The exchange is aborted if one party fails to transmit 
the specified message within the allocated time. The exchange takes place 
in the time between Beacon broadcasts. This time A is divided in six equal 
segments. The protocol is as follows: 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
t < time <t+lA 
i + iA < time <t+\A 
t+\A< time <t+^A 
i + ^A < time <t+^A 
Alice Bob: Pa 
Bob => Alice: Pb 
Alice =i> Bob: 
Bob Alice: zjg 
i = i^ + ismoclN 
Alice Bob: {C,2, i + 
Bob Alice: {C,i,t + Ajx^ 
Within the first segment (hnes 1 and 2) the two parties are required to 
exchange the preliminary contract. In the next two segments both Alice and 
Bob exchange a random number that each has generated independently, that 
is iA and is- Each party is then able to calculate i. Last, (lines 6 and 7) 
the two parties sign and exchange the messages that could bind them to the 
contract. These messages contain the contract name, C, and possibly the 
next token. If neither party has cheated and the next token emitted by the 
Beacon contains then both parties are committed to the contract at the 
same time. If the next emitted token does not contain 2, then neither parties 
are committed and steps 3 to 7 have to be repeated. Rabin showed that in 
such an exchange there is a probability of 1/N that one of the parties could 
cheat successfully. 
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7.2 Beacons for Secure Communication 
A Beacon, within the context of secure communications, is a service that is 
provided by a secure host in a computer network. The Beacon broadcasts, 
at regular intervals, a nonce encapsulated within a certified token. The 
emitted token would be accessible to all hosts on the network and each host 
maintains a short list of fresh tokens. The additional load caused by this 
service would be small as each host is only required to listen for a short and 
relatively infrequent message. The following is a more detailed description 
of the concept, feasibihty and implementation of a Beacon. t 
7.2.1 Token 
The token has the following form: 
Ni,time,life,{MDC}xb 
where: 
Ni is a freshly generated nonce. 
time is the time at which the token was emitted. 
life is the time after which the token will not be valid. 
MDC is the Manipulation Detection Code. 
Xbn is the Beacon's secret encryption key which is used to certify the token. 
Each host which receives the token is able to verify its validity by decrypting 
the MDC using the Beacon's public key. The MDC insures that the token 
has not been tampered with. Since the token is signed with the Beacon's 
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secret key it is reasonable to assume the token originated from tiie Beacon. 
Each host is able to maintain, on behalf of its principals, a short list of 
currently valid tokens. Thus these tokens are available to all principals to 
use in the authentication process. 
7.2.2 Network Synchronization 
There is reliance within a Beacon based system on each principal having 
access to a stable clock and that these clocks are to some extent synchronized. 
Since the life of a token can be relatively long, say an hour, differences of a 
few seconds between the hosts can be tolerated. In this section we examine 
the Internet's Network Time Protocol (NTP) to show that in fact it is feasible 
to have much closer synchronization between communication hosts. 
Any attempt to synchronize communicating entities requires access to an 
accurate standard. Since 1972 the time standard for the world has been 
based on International Atomic Time which is currently maintained to an 
accuracy of a few parts in [2]. Many countries operate standard time 
and frequency broadcast stations which collectively cover most areas of the 
world. 
The network time protocol (NTP) is an Internet standard protocol [31] which 
is used to maintain a network of time servers, accessible over normal Internet 
paths. Even though transmission delays over Internet can vary widely, due 
to fluctuations in traffic loads and dynamic message routing, NTP acts to 
provide global synchronization. NTP is built on Internet's User Datagram 
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Protocol (UDP) [28] which provides a connectionless transport mechanism 
over a wide and dispersed network which requires stable local clocks. 
The NTP system consists of a network of primary servers and an estimated 
total of over 2000 secondary time servers. Primary time servers are directly 
synchronized by reference source, usually a timecode receiver, or a calibrated 
atomic clock. Secondary time servers are synchronized by either a primary 
server or another secondary time server. Due to the wide dispersal of these 
servers, access is available using some thousands of routes over hundreds of 
networks, making the system very reliable. 
.--IV ' 
In a typical configuration used at the University of Illinois and the University 
of Delaware, the institutions operate three campus servers. These servers are 
synchronized using two primary servers and each other. The three campus 
servers in turn provide synchronization for department servers which then 
deliver time to remaining hosts. In such a configuration synchronization of 
several hundred milliseconds-seconds would not be uncommon. 
7.2.3 Creating a Beacon 
As stated above, a Beacon is a service which, at regular intervals, emits a 
token which can be authenticated. The emitted token must be accessible 
to all hosts on the network and each host is required to maintain a short 
list of fresh tokens. Since the broadcast is short and relatively infrequent, 
implementation is quite feasible in either software or hardware. Algorithm 
1 shows the functionality. 
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Algorithm 1 Beaconf) 
1. t = clockA 
2. Ni = G{) 
3. MDCi = h{t,life,Ni) 
4. T = t , l i fe ,Ni , {MDC^}xnN 
5. while {clock < t) wait 
6. broadcast(T) 
7. goto( l ) 
end 
The algorithm begins by setting, t, the time for the next broadcast. Next, 
the token is constructed prior to broadcasting (lines 2 to 4). The crypto-
graphically strong pseudo-random generator, G(), is used to create a nonce 
Ni. The final component required to create the token is the manipulation 
detection code (MDC). The one-way hash function, /i, is employed to com-
press the bit string created by the concatenation of the broadcast time, t, 
the token life, I and the nonce Ni. The output, which is of a fixed length, is 
used as the MDC. The token, T, consists of the MDC, MDCi, signed with 
the Beacon's private key and the other three fields. The token is broadcast 
at time t (lines 5 and 6). The algorithm is then repeated (line 7). 
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7.2.4 One-time Token 
It is generally accepted that the beneficial features of a public key cryp-
tographic system are bought at the expense of speed. At present it is not 
feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption. In practice, however, 
it is quite desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key system 
is used for authentication and distribution of a session key. The session key 
would then be used by the two principals to communicate securely using a 
symmetric key system. 
With a Beacon based system, a "one-time token" can be used to simplify 
the process. A one-time token it is a token emitted by the Beacon which 
can be used only once to obtain service from a particular server; much like 
an admission ticket to a theatre. Once the token has been presented, it is 
marked and will not be accepted by that server on any subsequent occasion. 
The task of marking tokens is much easier for the server than maintaining 
a database of prior requests. The use of one-time tokens eliminates the 
» 
possibility of a replay attack and thus simplifies the authentication process. 
To illustrate the process consider a very simple case. Alice wishes to com-
municate securely with Bob. In this case Bob can be thought of as being 
the server and Alice the chent. Assume, for simplicity, that AHce and Bob 
communicated yesterday and they are both certain that each knows the 
other's public key. Such an occurrence is not uncommon in a distributed 
system' since most principals communicate within a small group and cache 
7.2. BEACONS FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION 95 
is commonly used to store commonly used keys. The process licis two steps: 
1. Alice Bob: AHce,A^-,{A'^^Jy^, 
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message wliich contains, 
her name, the nonce Ni, and a session key KA,B- The session key is 
created by Alice, and it is to be used with a symmetric cryptographic 
system, to secure subsequent messages. Since the session key is the 
secret in the message, it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's 
public key, Yg. The nonce, Ni, is selected at random by Alice from 
the list of active tokens and ensures message freshness. The message 
integrity is protected using a MDC which is signed by Alice. 
2. Bob Alice: {Ni}K^ B 
Bob having received the request for communication can confirm that 
the message did come from Ahce and that it has not been altered. The 
freshness of the message is guaranteed by the use of a nonce, Ni, which 
was recently broadcast by the Beacon. Since the nonce can be used 
only once there is of course a finite probability that the nonce chosen 
by the Alice from the active list has already been presented to Bob by 
someone else. In such a case the request would be rejected and Alice 
would have to re-apply with an other nonce. The probability of such a 
collision occurring is dependent on factors such as network load, token 
frequency and token life. In a practical applications the additional load 
caused by this effect should be minimal. 
Having received a session key which he can trust, Bob completes the 
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protocol by authenticating himself to Alice. He enciphers the nonce 
with a session key and sends it to Alice. Since only Bob could have 
obtained the session key, the message proves Bob's identity. 
Chapter 8 
Beaconizing the Needham 
and Schroeder Protocol 
The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol [24] is arguably one of the best 
known authentication and key distribution protocols. It has been the basis of 
a number of systems that use the nonce to prove freshness. In 1981 Denning 
and Sacco [11] pointed out a weakness in the NS protocol and suggested 
the use of time-stamped certificates to guard against a replay attack. Since 
that time authentication protocols have been divided into two groups, one 
preferring the use of nonces and the other preferring time-stamps. 
In this section we briefly outline the NS protocol using asymmetric keys. 
Next we will describe the weakness pointed out by Denning and Sacco and 
their solution to the problem. We will then modify the NS protocol to take 
advantage of a Beacon. We will show that the modified protocol simplifies 
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the solution to the authentication problem and has advantages over both the 
NS protocol and modified protocol suggested by Denning and Sacco. 
This chapter is included in the paper: 
A. Jiwa, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng. Beacon based authentication. In Pro-
ceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ES-
ORICS'94), Brighton, UK, Nov 1994, accepted for publication by Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelb erg-New York, 
1994. 
8.1 Needham and Schroeder Protocol 
The NS protocol requires a trusted authentication server (AS) to establish 
trust between two principals wishing to communicate. Each principal within 
a realm which is dominated by a particular AS, is required to register his 
public key with that AS. To establish trust between principals, the AS must 
have the trust of all principals within its realm, to maintain and distribute 
these keys reliably. 
The NS protocol can be divided into distinct sections. The first is the public 
key distribution protocol which is used by a principal to communicate with 
the AS in order to obtain a public key belonging to another principal. The 
second is the connection protocol which is used by two principals to establish 
an coiwersation and authenticate each other. The following illustrates the 
two protocol sections. 
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Public Key Distribution Protocol 
Consider the situation where Alice wishes to communicate with Bob but is 
not certain of his public key. Thus she must apply to the AS to obtain Bob's 
public key. The steps required are illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
AUTHENTICATION SERVER 
/ ^ \ 
• 
ALICE BOB 
Figure 8.1: The Needham and Schroeder Fubhc Key Distribution Protocol 
1. Alice AS: Alice,Bob 
Alice sends a message to the AS requesting the pubhc key of the named 
principal; that is Bob's public key. The requesting message is in clear 
text and also contains the identity of the requesting principal; that is 
Alice. 
2. AS AHce: {Bob,yB}A', 
The AS responds with a message containing the requested public key 
and is signed with the AS's private key. The message contains the name 
of the key's owner which allows Alice to verify that the reply contains 
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the correct key. Since the reply contains no secret information, it is 
only signed by the AS. 
This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance that the request was 
initiated by Alice or the freshness of the AS's reply. 
Connection Protocol 
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain any required keys 
from the AS, the following are the steps required for them to authenticate 
each other in order to establish a conversation. Alice is the initiator (see 
Figure 8.2). 
Figure 8.2: The Needham and Schroeder Connection Protocol 
1. Alice Bob: {iV^,Alice}y^ 
Knowing Bob's public key, Alice is able initiate the authentication 
process by sending Bob a message which contains a nonce, NA, and 
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her identity. The message is enciphered with Bob's public key, YB, 
which means only Bob will be able to access NA-
2. Bob Alice: { N A , N B } Y ^ 
On receiving the message, Bob is able to obtain the nonce NA- How-
ever, Bob cannot be certain of freshness nor who the actual sender 
is. To verify the sender's identity and guard against a replay attack, 
Bob generates a nonce, NB, and sends it to Alice. Bob also takes the 
opportunity to prove his identity to Alice by including NA in the reply. 
The message to Alice is encrypted with Alice's public key. 
3. Alice Bob: {iVfily^ 
As a final step in this authentication process, Alice proves her identity 
to Bob by returning NB-
Even though both principals are certain of the other's public key, the three 
step authentication process is still required to ensure freshness and guard 
against a replay attack. 
8.2 Protocol Weakness 
In [11] Denning and Sacco analyzed the protocol and pointed out that it is 
only secure while there hasn't been a key compromise. To examine the weak-
ness let us suppose that an adversary, Charles, has managed to obtain Alice's 
private key. Also he has been able to record past conversations between the 
AS, Bob and Alice. Charles is able to use these to maintain confidence in 
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Alice's compromised key. He does this by replaying an old response by the 
AS to requests for Alice's public key. The replay of course distributes the 
compromised key. To illustrate, the following shows how Charles is able to 
trick Bob. 
1. Bob AS: Alice,Bob 
The Bob sends a message to the AS requesting Alice's public key. 
^AS 2. Charles Bob: {Alice,Y^}x 
Charles intercepts the message and replies to the request by replaying 
an old key distribution message. Since the reply is signed by the'AS, 
Bob is tricked into accepting the message and thus the compromised 
key, y ; . 
Since the key distribution message never expires and does not contain the 
name of the requesting principal, Charles will be to trick any principal within 
the realm until the AS changes its key pair. Not only is Charles able to 
masquerade as Alice but also by blocking the distribution of her new key, he 
can deny her any service he chooses. 
8.3 Denning and Sacco's Modification 
The solution suggested Denning and Sacco uses time stamped certificates. 
The form of these certificates is as follows: 
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{J',Yp,Th- AS 
where: 
P —̂  is the principal's identification. 
Vp is the public key belonging to principal P. 
T — » i s the time at which the certificate was issued. 
Xas is the AS's private key which is used to sign the certificate. 
The Denning and Sacco modified protocol combines the authentication and 
key distribution into a single process. That is, if the principals are able to 
t 
obtain public keys reliably and miessage freshness can be guaranteed, then 
the communicating principals are able to use the features of their public key 
cryptographic system to authenticate messages. The steps of the modified 
protocol are illustrated in Figure 8.3. 
AUTHENTICATION SERVER 
AUCE — ^ , b o b 
Figure 8.3: The Denning and Sacco Modified Protocol 
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1. Alice AS: Alice,Bob 
As before tlie Alice sends a message to the AS. However this request 
is for two certificates, one containing Bob's public key and the other 
containing Alice's public key. The later is intended to enable Bob to 
securely obtain Alice's public key. 
2. AS Alice: C'a.Cb 
The AS responds with a message continuing two signed certificates. 
Ca contains Alice's public key and Cb contains Bob's. 
3. Alice Bob: Ca,Cb 
t 
Alice initiates the conversation with Bob by sending the certificates 
she obtained from the AS. Since the certificates are signed by the AS 
and contain a time-stamp to prove freshness, Bob is able to trust them. 
In [11] Denning and Sacco point out that in order for Alice to obtain the 
certificates and deliver them to Bob, the certificates must have a lifetime. 
By this it is meant, the certificates must be valid for a duration of time. The 
length of the certificate lifetime would depend on factors such as synchro-
nization discrepancy between hosts and communication delays. During this 
period the protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack. Thus if the certificate 
lifetime is kept short, the protocol reduces the likelihood of a replay attack, 
but it does not eliminate it. 
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer 
able to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be 
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kept short to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all 
conversations. 
8.4 A Beacon Based Approach 
We now introduce a Beacon to the distributed system and modify the NS 
protocol to take advantage of the new service. As in the unmodified NS 
protocol, the beaconized protocol can be divided into two sections. The 
first enables a principal to obtain another's public key. The second, the 
connection protocol, is used by a principal to initiate a conversation. We'end 
this section by modifying the connection protocol to include the distribution 
of a symmetric session key. Once again we will use the over worked principals, 
Alice and Bob, to demonstrate the protocol features. 
Public Key Distribution Protocol 
The following are the steps required for Alice to obtain Bob's public key (see 
Figure 8.4). 
1. Alice AS: Alice,Bob 
Alice sends a message to the AS stating her name is Alice and request-
ing Bob's public key. The message is in plaintext and only contains 
the two identities. 
2. AS Alice: Boh,YB,Ni, ( M D C j x ^ s 
Since the reply to Alice contains no secret information, the message 
is not enciphered. As in the NS protocol the message contains the 
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AUTHENTICATION SERVER 
# 
BEACON 
, • • . 
1 / 
ALICE 
• 
BOB 
Figure 8.4: The Beacon Based Public Key Distribution Protocol 
requested public key and the name of the key's owner. This ensures 
that the request made by Alice has not been altered. The nonce, Ni, 
is picked randomly by the Beacon from the list of active tokens and 
is used to guarantee that this message is not a replay. The message 
integrity is ensured by the MDC which is signed by the AS. 
Since the Beacon based system uses the concept of a "one-time token", if Ni 
has previously been presented to Alice, then it would have been marked and 
consequently the AS's reply would be rejected. In such circumstances, Alice 
would have to reinitated the request. The probability of such a collision 
occurring, in a practical application, is quite low. 
Connection Protocol 
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain the required keys, 
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the following is the step required for Alice to initiate a conversation (see 
Figure 8.5). 
AUTHENTICATION SERVER BEACON . • • • 
* . ^ . 
1 
AT ICE BOB 
1 
Figure 8.5: The Beacon Based Public Key Distribution Protocol 
1. AUce ^ Bob: A]lce,Ni,{MDC}x^ 
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains 
her name and the nonce, Ni. The nonce is selected at random by 
Alice from the list of active tokens and is used to ensures message 
freshness. The message integrity is protected using a MDC which is 
signed by Alice. Since the message contains no secret information it is 
not encrypted with Bob's public key. 
If Ni has previously been presented to Bob, then it would have been marked 
and the request for connection would be rejected. In such an event Bob 
would reply with an error message and Alice would select another nonce and 
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reinitiate the request. 
Distribution of a Symmetric key. 
At present it is not feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption. 
Thus, it is quite desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key 
system is used for authentication and distribution of a session key. The 
session key would then be used by the two principals to communicate securely 
using a symmetric key system. We now modify the protocol to allow the 
two principals, Alice and Bob, to share a session key. 
1. Alice Bob: AHce,iV,, 
Alice would initiate such an exchange by sending Bob a message con-
taining her name, the nonce TV,-, and the session key, Ka,B' Once again 
Ni is used to ensure freshness. Since the session key is the only secret 
in the message, it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's pub-
lic key, Ffi.The message integrity is protected using a MDC which is 
signed by Alice. 
8.5 Attacks on the Modified Protocol 
The attacks that can be launched against the beaconized protocol can be 
broken up in to six categories. In the foUowing section the effects of these 
are discussed in turn. 
• -In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of 
the principals in the system. Since the principal's secret key is used 
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to prove its identity, for such an attack to succeed an adversary would 
require knowledge of such a key. If a principal's secret key were to 
be compromised, it is possible that an adversary could masquerade 
as that principal while the problem was undetected and thus before a 
new key is distributed. However unlike the NS protocol, an adversary 
is unable to block the distribution of new keys. 
• By eavesdropping (or monitoring) network traffic, an adversary hopes 
to gain some advantage or learn some secret. Since the public key 
protocol does not require the transmission of any secret information, 
such an attack cannot succeed. In the case of the hybrid system, the 
session key is enciphered. Thus an adversary would require knowledge 
of the deciphering key. 
• The goal of a replay attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowl-
edge by retransmitting a message that was intercepted earlier. There 
are three distinct areas in which a replay attack could be attempted. 
They are: 
1. The token transmitted by the Beacon. The purpose of this mes-
sage is to broadcast a unique token to all hosts on the network. 
Since the token has a finite life, if an expired token were retrans-
mitted, the message would simply be discarded. Replaying the 
message before the token expires gains no advantage for the adver-
sary as the duplicate token would be detected and thus discarded. 
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2. The second attempt could be made against the public key dis-
tribution portion of the protocol. The protocol consists of two 
messages. The effect of replaying these would be: 
- The protocol is initiated by a principal requesting another 
principal's public key. The request is in plaintext and is di-
rected to the AS. Since the information is public and the ser-
vice is freely available, the adversary can gain nothing new. 
- The reply from the AS contains the requested public key. The 
message is unique. It contains the name of the recipient, a 
i 
one-time nonce and is signed by the sender, hence a replayed 
message would be detected. 
3. The final message that could be replayed is the request for con-
nection. This message is also unique, thus a replayed message 
would be detected and the attack would fail. 
• A m.odification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets 
as they travel across the computer network. For such an attack to 
succeed the change must be undetected. Such an attack would be 
futile because the recipient of a message is always able to detect any 
changes. 
• An attempt to delay authentication messages would cause the token to 
expire and prevent the principal from completing the authentication 
process. Such an attack would have the same results as "denial of 
service". 
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• A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary that is 
able to hinder communications is some manner. Detection and counter-
ing such an attack is best dealt with by other means such as statistical 
monitoring of the network. 
8.6 Discussion of Advantages 
In this section we discuss the advantages gained by use of a beaconized ap-
proach over the NS protocol or the time base protocol suggested by Denning 
and Sacco. 
The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol has been the basis for a number 
of systems. The approach taken by them requires principals, wishing to 
establish a conversation, to engage in a three step message exchange. The 
purpose of this exchange is to ascertain the identity of the other principal 
and to guard against a replay attack. The distribution of public keys is 
provided by a trusted authentication server, AS. In the worst case, where 
both principals require the services of the AS to obtain public keys, the 
protocol requires a total of seven messages to be exchanged. 
In [11], Denning and Sacco pointed out that the NS protocol is vulnerable to 
a replay attack in the event that a principal's key is compromised. To over-
come this difficulty, Denning and Sacco suggested the use of time-stamped 
certificates. The resulting protocol requires a principal who wishes to initi-
ate a conversation, to contact the AS to obtain two certificates; one for each 
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principal. Each certificate has a finite life and contains a public key. One 
benefit of this approach is that the number of messages required to initiate 
a conversation is reduced to three. However, during the period between the 
certificate being issued and expiring, the modified protocol is also vulnera-
ble to a replay attack. The protocol does not eliminate the possibility of a 
replay attack, but reduces it. 
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer 
able to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be 
kept short to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all 
conversations. This means that a greater amount of trust is invested in the 
AS and the realm now has a single point of failure. 
The fundamental difference between our approach is the use of a Beacon to 
deliver a "one-time token" to each host. This simplifies the authentication 
process by taking advantage of the features of a public key cryptographic 
system. In contrast to the modification proposed by Denning and Sacco, 
the beaconized approach eliminates the possibility of a replay attack, allows 
principals to cache commonly used keys and reduces the role of the AS to a 
"key look-up service". 
Chapter 9 
Concluding Remarks 
9.1 Summary 
This work has been motivated by the universal concern being expressed by 
users of large open networks such as the Internet. Currently, there are an es-
timated twenty million users who use the Internet in seventy countries. The 
Internet is used to carry data from a variety of sources including research or-
ganizations, government bodies and business. Increasingly, the information 
being transmitted is sensitive and concerns about data privacy and integrity 
are growing. New users are estimated to be joining the Internet community 
at between 15 to 20 percent per month [18 . 
In chapters two through to four we examined these concerns and gained 
a better understanding of the internet environment. In the next chapter 
we examined some of the primitive security services that can be used to 
114 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
provide solutions for communicating entities. It is safe to say the reliable 
authentication of communicating entities is essential for achieving security 
in a distributed computing environment. 
The design of such systems as Kerberos [40, 19, 4], SPX [42] and more re-
cently KryptoKnight [22] and Kuperee [15], have largely been successful in 
addressing the problem. In chapter six we examined two of these systems, 
Kerberos and KryptoKnight. The common element with these implemen-
tations is the need for a trusted third-party authentication service. This 
essentially requires a great deal of trust to be invested in the authentication 
t 
server which adds a level of complexity and reduces, system flexibility. 
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties was 
first suggested by M. Rabin in [30]. In chapter seven we revive Rabin's ideas 
which have been largely overlooked for the past decade. In particular we 
present a novel approach to the authentication problem based on a service 
called Beacon which continuously broadcasts certified nonces. We showed 
that this approach considerably simplifies authentication and key distribu-
tion. 
In chapter eight we illustrated the impact of such a service by "Beaconiz-
ing" the well know Needham and Schroeder protocol. We showed that the 
modified protocol simplifies authentication and key distribution and has ad-
vantages over both the Needham and Schroeder [24] protocol and modified 
protocol suggested by Denning and Sacco [11]. We believe our solution wiU 
have wide applications in tranborder network protocols due to the ellmina-
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tion of replay attacks and its increased efficiency. 
9.2 Future Considerations 
In this section we discuss some of the issues and items for future work which 
we hope will include implementation. 
9.2.1 Inter-Realm Support 
Within the Internet, individual computers and workstations are connected 
t 
together by a Local Area Network (LAN). The LAN is likely to span a 
building or part of a building, allowing the individual hosts to communicate 
and share resources locally. Typically, these LANs may be connected to 
a site backbone which interconnects the individual LANs within a single 
site. Such architectures are commonly found within University campuses 
and building complexes. The Beacon based protocol presented in this thesis 
is highly suited to such a single realm environment. 
Connections beyond the site are provided by a Wide Area Network (WAN). 
Unlike LANs, WANs are used for long-haul services and consist of a collec-
tion of links that are connected by gateways. These gateways are dispersed 
over a large geographical area. Currently, the Beacon based protocol has no 
provision for the support of communications between individual sites. How-
ever, a number of inter-realm authentication protocols have already been 
designed. The beaconization of such a system may provide a natural ex-
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tension. The manner in which a system of inter-realm Beacons would be 
organized, remains an open problem. 
9.2.2 Identity Based Cryptographic Schemes 
In 1984, Shamir [37] introduced the concept of an identity based crypto-
graphic system. In such a system a user is required to register with a trusted 
Key Generation Centre (KGC) as a part of the process of joining a commu-
nity of networked principals. The user, if accepted by the KGC, would be 
issued with a secret key. This secret key would be constructed, by the KGC, 
in such a manner that the user's identity can be used as his (or her) public 
key. It can be assumed that the user's identity is unique and is available to 
other principals within the community. 
Since then a great deal of work has been done and various schemes have 
been put forward (eg. [16, 27, 43]). There exist a tantalizing possibility of 
applying a Beacon to such a scheme, there by eliminating the need for an 
Authentication Server. 
9.2.3 Implementation of a Secure Systems 
The requirements associated with the development of any system can be 
placed in two broad categories [14]. The first, comprises those requirements 
that are associated with the system's functionality, that is, the characteristic 
goals which must achieved by the development process. These may include 
such items as the number of messages the system must process per second. 
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or the characteristics of the file access mechanism. The second category 
comprises those requirements that are levied against the development pro-
cess by the organization's procedures. Items such as specifications, plans, 
configuration management and test procedure, would fall into this category. 
For the development of a system that could be considered to be verify ably 
secure, additional constraints are placed on both of the above categories. 
Published guidelines (eg. [25, 26]) have aided in providing a better un-
derstanding of the goals which have to be met by a secure system. The 
fundamental requirement of a secure system is to provide an increased level 
of assurance for users. The increased assurance is obtained via increased 
understanding of the design and implementation. 
Currently, a great deal of effort is being directed toward providing appro-
priate specification methodology, verification tools and security modeling. 
An implementation of a Beacon based system could be used as a vehicle to 
extend these areas. 
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Abstract. 
Reliable authentication of communicating entities is essential for achiev-
ing security in a distributed computing environment. The design of such 
systems as Kerberos, SPX and more recently KryptoKnight and Ku-
peree, have largely been successful in addressing the problem. The com-
mon element with these implementations is the need for a trusted third-
party authentication service. This essentially requires a great deal of 
trust to be invested in the authentication server which adds a level of 
comple.xity and reduces system fle>dbility. j 
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties 
was first suggested by M. Rabin in "Transactions protected by beacons," 
Journal of Computer and System Sciences , Vol 27, pp 256-267, 1983. In 
this paper we revive Rabin's ideas which have been largely overlooked in 
the past decade. In particular we present a novel approach to the authen-
tication problem based on a service called Beacon which continuously 
broadcasts certified nonces. We argue that this approach considerably 
simplifies the solution to the authentication problem and we illustrate 
the impact of such a service by "Beaconizing" the well know Needham 
and Schroeder protocol. The modified protocol would be suitable for de-
ployment at upper layers of the communication stack. 
Term Index: Beacon, Authentication, Network Security, Information Se-
curity, Security Protocol. 
1 Introduction 
In the past thirty years the rapid evolution of electronic data communication 
has been breath taking. This growth and reliance on electronic communication 
has increased concern about data privacy and integrity. Much effort is currently 
being devoted to providing security services for a variety of communication en-
vironments. Authentication is universally acknowledged as being essential for 
secure communications in a distributed system. 
Informally, authentication is the capability of the recipient of a communica-
tion to be able to verify that the message did come from the alleged sender. As 
a further requirement, it is usual to expect such systems to perform verification 
over an open insecure network. This requirement constrains the authentication 
system in the following manner: 
- Reliance must not be placed in the physical security of all hosts in the 
distributed system. 
- It should be assumed that packets traveling along the network can be read, 
modified and inserted with little effort by an adversary. 
- Trust cannot be based on the senders' address. 
- Trust cannot be based on the senders' operating system security. 
Currently, the dominant authentication protocols employed in a client-server 
environment use a broker to arbitrate between principals who wish to com-
municate. In such a scheme, a principal must first contact the broker to obtain 
credentials which can be trusted by its communicating partner. The protocol will 
typically rely on an exchange of cryptographic messages and the participant's 
knowledge of some secret. Well known examples of such systems are Kerberos 
[2, 3, 7], SPX [4], KryptoKnight [5] and Kuperee [6]. 
In this paper we present a novel approach to the authentication problem for 
a distributed computer system using a public key cryptographic system and we 
introduce a new service called Beacon which has been inspired by Rabin [1]. A 
Beacon broadcasts, at regular intervals, certified nonces which are accessible to 
all hosts within the network. In section 3 we give a brief description of Rabin's 
use of Beacons. In section 4 the approach taken in this paper is described. 
As a means of contrasting the Beacon based approach to authentication with 
the more established authentication protocols, in section 5 we "beaconize" the 
very well known Needham and Schroeder public key protocol. We assume that 
the reader is familiar with the basic philosophy of Needham and Schroeder. For 
a complete description of the protocol we would direct the reader to [8]. 
In section 6 we discuss the advantages of the beaconized approach. The paper 
finally closes in section 7 with some concluding remarks. 
2 Conventions 
Throughout this paper certain terms are used that may appear to be ambiguous 
or new to readers. In the following section the use of these terms, in the context 
of this document, are stated. This should avoid any difficulty caused by them 
being used differently elsewhere. 
2.1 Terminology 
A ho si is a computer with a unique address that is connected to a computer 
network. 
The user is the human being who is using some services that are provided by the 
network. All programs in the system are initiated by users. The main purpose 
of authentication is to verify the identity of the users within a network. 
A client is a program that runs on behalf of a user in order to request some 
service that is available on a remote host. Since the client runs on a user's be-
half, it assumes the user identity and privileges. Any action taken by a client is 
said to have been carried out by the user. 
The server is a program that provides a service to a client on the network. 
It is usually installed by the system administrator and runs on behalf of the 
system. A server remains active in a network for much longer than a client and 
thus is given an identity. By this it is meant that each server is registered with 
the system, in a similar manner to a user, and that it must prove its identity 
before a client will accept it. 
Any communicating network entity, that is client or server, can be referred to 
as a principal. 
A realm is organized in a hierarchical structure and has a strong analogy to 
domains in Internet. A single authentication server, be it a Beacon or Third-
party Authenticator, is responsible for all local principals. This collection of 
network entities, the authentication server and its clients, are referred to CLS, a 
realm. A client who wishes to obtain some service from a server within the same 
realm would use the service to prove its identity. 
2.2 Cryptographic Requirements 
The Beacon bcised system relies on a public key (or asymmetric) cryptographic 
system. Many such systems have been designed and examples of such schemes 
can be found in [10, 11]. For the purpose of our discussions the system's crypto-
graphic requirements can be simplified and kept generic. 
A public key system differs from a secret key (or symmetric) system in that 
each principal in the distributed system hcis a pair of keys. The calculation of 
this private and public key pair, given the initial conditions, is easy. However, 
it would be infeasible for an adversary who knows a public key to calculate the 
secret key or the initial conditions. Each principal heis a private key which is 
kept secret' and is only known to that principal. The corresponding public key 
is made available to all other principals. In the remainder of this paper " { } z " 
means encipher with key Z. The private and public key pair will be denoted as 
"A'" and "Y" respectively and subscripts will be used to identify the associated 
principal. Thus the Beacon would have a key pair Xen^Ybn, the principal, 
Alice, would have the pair Xa.Ya while Bob would have Xb,Yb-
The advantage of a public key system is that it supports secrecy, authentica-
tion, and integrity. Communication secrecy is supported by the transformations: 
M = {{M]Ys)xe 
That is, suppose Alice wishes send a secret message, M, to Bob. Then Alice 
must have access Bob's public key and encipher the message, thus: 
C={M}ys 
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Alice sends Bob the cryptographic string C. On receipt Bob is able to employ 
his private key to decipher the message. 
{C}XS = { { M } Y S } X S = M 
The encryption and decryption processes are easy using the appropriate keys. 
However, it would be infeasible for an adversary to decipher C without the 
private key XB, ensuring secrecy. Now, since YB is publicly known, Bob has no 
way of being certain of the sender's identity. Thus authenticity has not been 
assured using this method. 
Authentication, using a public key system, is satisfied by the following trans-
formation. 
Alice is able to "sign" her message to Bob'by using her private key, XA 
C = { M } X . 
Bob is able to verify that the message could have only come from Alice by 
deciphering the message using Alice's public key, YA, thus: 
If the message is plain-text. Bob knows that C has in fact not been altered. 
However, if the message, or any portion of the message, is a random string then it 
may be difficult for Bob to ascertain that the message has not been altered merely 
by examining it. For this reason it is more usual for Alice to employ a suitable 
one-way hashing function (eg. [12, 13]) to produce a Message Authentication 
Code (MAC). Alice would sign the MAC with her private key and append it to 
the message. On receiving the message. Bob is able to reproduce the MAC in 
order to confirm that the message is from Alice and that it has not been altered. 
Finally, all three can be employed by Alice to communicate securely with Bob 
thus: 
C = { M , { M A C } X . } Y S 
3 Rabin's Approach Using Beacons 
The use of a Beacon as a security service within a distributed computer system 
was first suggested by M. Rabin [1]. He defined a Beacon as emitting, at regular 
interval, a random integer sealed using a suitable cryptographic signature system. 
The integer would be selected randomly and uniformly within the range 1 to N, 
where N is publicly known. With this basic concept he proposed two protocols 
based on a probabilistic approach, one for the signing of contracts and the second 
for information disclosure. In the following section Rabin's use of Beacons is 
illustrated by briefly outlining the contract signing protocol. For a full account, 
the reader is referred to the original paper. 
Consider, Alice and Bob have negotiated a contract over a computer network 
and are ready to exchange signed copies. It is not possible for them to meet and 
they wish using the network to exchange electronically. We can assume that the 
contracts can be signed by an suitable electronic signature scheme. The problem 
addressed by Rabin was, if Alice signs and sends the contract to Bob, then Alice 
is committed, but Bob is not. Bob could take the opportunity to look for a better 
deal, leaving Alice vulnerable. A similar argument can be made about Bob. 
In Rabin's protocol we can assume the following initial conditions: 
- Each of the participants has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair which can 
be used for signing messages and verifying signatures. The Beacon has the 
private and public key pair XBN,YBN, Alice's keys are XA,YA and Bob's 
are XB,YB- The public keys, YBN, YA and YB are widely known and are 
available to the participants. Each participant's private key has been kept 
secret and is known only to its owner. 
- The Beacon broadcasts a token, T every A seconds and the next broadcast 
will be at time t A. The T has the following form: 
{T,I}XBN 
where i is the time at which the token was emitted and i is a randomly 
selected integer between 1 and N. The value of N is publicly known. The 
Beacon seals the token using its private key XBN-
- Alice and Bob have agreed to the contract name, C, such that: 
C = h{coniract) 
where a suitable hash function h is applied to the text of the contract and 
the obtained result is used to denote the contract. 
- Alice and Bob have agreed and signed preliminary agreements. We will refer 
to these agreements signed by Alice and Bob as PA and PB respectively. The 
text of PA is as follows: 
{If Boh can produce (C,T) signed by Alice and T signed by the Beacon for 
some token T, then I, Alice will be conimitied io the contract as of the time 
t mentioned in the token T. jx^i 
Bob signs a similar contract with the name Alice and Bob exchanged. Since 
this agreement does not bind either parties to the contract, it reasonable to 
assume that this initial exchange will pass oif without incident. 
The protocol for the exchange of contracts requires that both parties follow 
timed sequence. The exchange is aborted if one party fails to transmit the spec-
ified message within the allocated time. The exchange takes place in the time 
between Beacon broadcasts. This time A is divided in six equal segment. The 
protocol is as follows: 
1. i > time <t+ Alice Bob: Pa 
2. Bob => Alice: Pb 
3. i + > time < < + Alice Bob: iA 
4. i + > time <t+^A Bob ^ Alice: is 
5. i = iA + iBmodN 
6. t-\-iA> time <t-{-^A Alice Bob: {C , i , t + A}xA 
7. Bob Alice: {C, i,t + A}xb 
Within the first segment (lines 1 and 2) the two parties are required to 
exchange the preliminary contract. In the next two segments both Alice and 
Bob exchange random number that each has generated independently, that is 
¡A and is. Each party is then able to calculate i. Final, (lines 6 and 7) the two 
parties sign and exchange the messages that could bind them to the contract. 
These messages contain the contract name, C, and possibly the next token. If 
neither party has cheated and the next token emitted by the Beacon* contains i, 
then both parties are committed to the contract at the' same time. If the next 
emitted token does not contain ¿, then neither parties are committed and steps 
3 to 7 have to be repeated. Rabin showed that in such an exchange there is a 
probability of 1/N that one of the parties could cheat successfully. 
4 Beacons 
Rabin's novel ideas on the use of beacons have been largely overlooked by the 
research community during the past decade. We revive these ideas by transferring 
them to the authentication problem. The following is a more detailed description 
of the concept, feasibility and implementation of a Beacon. 
A Beacon, within the context of this paper, is a service that is provided 
by a secure host in a computer network. The Beacon broadcasts, at regular 
intervals, a nonce encapsulated within a certified token. The emitted token would 
be accessible to all hosts on the network and each host maintains a short list of 
fresh tokens. The additional load caused by this service would be small as each 
host is only required to listen for a short and relatively infrequent message. 
4.1 Token 
The token has the following form: 
Ni,time,life,{MAC]xb 
where: 
Ni —»• is a freshly generated nonce. 
time —is the time at which the token was emitted. 
life —is the time after which the token will not be valid. 
MAC is the message authentication code. 
^BN is the Beacon's secret encryption key which is used to certify the token. 
Each host which receives the token is able to verify its validity by decrypting 
the MAC using the Beacon's public key. The MAC insures that the token has not 
been tampered with. Since the token is signed with the Beacon's secret key it is 
reasonable to assume the token originated from the Beacon. Each host is able to 
maintain, on behalf of its principals, a short list of currently valid tokens. Thus 
these tokens are available to all principals to use in the authentication process. 
4.2 Network Synchronization 
There is reliance within a Beacon based system that each principal has access to 
a stable clock and that these clocks are to some extent synchronized. Since the 
life of a token can be relatively long, say an hour, differences of a few seconcis 
between the hosts can be tolerated. In this section we examine the Internet's 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) to show that in fact it is feasible to have much 
closer synchronization between communication hosts. 
Any attempt to synchronize communicating entities requires access to an 
accurate standard. Since 1972 the time standard for the world has been based 
on International Atomic Time which is currently maintained to an accuracy of 
a few parts in 10^- [14]. Many countries operate standard time and frequency 
broadcast stations which collectively cover most areas of the world. 
The network time protocol (NTP) is an Internet standard protocol [15] which 
is used to maintain a network of time servers, accessible over normal Internet 
paths. Even though transmission delays over Internet can vary widely, due to 
fluctuations in traflRc loads and dynamic message routing, NTP acts to pro-
vide global synchronization. NTP is built on Internet's User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) [16] which provides a connectionless transport mechanism. 
The NTP system consists of a network of primary and an estimated total of 
over 2000 secondary time servers. Primary time servers are directly synchronized 
by reference source, usually a timecode receiver, or a calibrated atomic clock. 
Secondary time servers are synchronized by either a primary server or another 
secondary time servers. Due to the wide dispersal of these servers, access is 
available using some thousands of routes over hundreds of networks, making the 
system very reliable. 
In a typical configuration used at the University of Illinois and the University 
of Delaware, the institutions operate three campus servers. These servers are 
synchronized using two primary servers and each other. The three campus servers 
in turn provide synchronization for department servers which then deliver time 
to remaining hosts. In such a configuration of several hundred synchronization 
milliseconds-seconds would not be uncommon. 
4.3 Creating a Beacon 
As stated above, a Beacon is a service whicli, at regular intervals, emits a token 
which can be authenticated. The emitted token must be accessible to all hosts 
on the network and each host is required to maintain a short list of fresh tokens. 
Since the broadcast is short and relatively infrequent, implementation is quite 
feasible in either software or hardware. Algorithm 1 shows the functionality. 
Algorithm 1 BeaconQ 
1 . t = clock + A 
2. Ni = GO 
3. MACi = h{t,life,Ni) 
4.T = t,life,Ni,{MACi}xs:. 
5. while (clock <t) wait 
6. broadcast(T) 
7. goto(l) 
end 
The algorithm begins by setting, Z, the time for the next broadcast. Next, 
the token is constructed prior to broadcasting (lines 2 to 4). The cryptograph-
ically strong pseudo-random generator, G(), is used to create a nonce Ni. The 
final component required to create the token is the message authentication code 
(MAC). The one-way hash function, h, is employed to compress the bit string 
created by the concatenation of the broadcast time, i, the token life, / and the 
nonce Ni. The output, which is of a fixed length, is used as the MAC. The token, 
T consists of the MAC, MACi, signed with the Beacon's private key and the 
other three fields. The token is broadcast at time t (lines 5 and 6). The algorithm 
is then repeated (line 7). 
4.4 One Use Token 
It is generally accepted that the beneficial features of a public key cryptosystem 
are bought at the expense of speed. At present it is not feasible to use a public 
key system for bulk encryption. In practice, however, it is quite desirable to 
create a hybrid system in which a public key system is used for authentication 
and distribution of a session key. The session key would then be used by the two 
principals to communicate securely using a symmetric key system. 
With a Beacon based system, a "one use token" can be used to simplify 
the process. By one use token it is meant that a token emitted by the Beacon 
can be used only once to obtain service from a particular server; much like an 
admission ticket to a theatre. Once the token has been presented, it is marked 
and will not be accepted by that server on any subsequent occasion. The process 
of marking tokens is much easier for the server than maintaining a database of 
prior requests. The use of one use tokens eliminates the possibility of a replay 
attack and thus simplifies the process. 
To illustrate the process consider a very simple case. Alice wishes to com-
municate securely with Bob. In this case Bob can be thought of as being the 
server and Alice the client. Assume, for simplicity, that Alice and Bob commu-
nicated yesterday and they are both certain that each knows the other's public 
key. Such an occurrence is not uncommon in a distributed system since most 
principals communicate within a small group and cache is commonly used to 
store commonly used keys. The process hcis two steps: 
1. Alice Bob: Alice,Ni, { K A , A 
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message in which contains, 
her name, the nonce iV,-, and a session key KA,B- The session key is created 
by Alice, and will is to be used with a symmetric cryptographic system, 
to secure subsequent messages. Since the session key is the secret in the 
message, it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's public key, YB-
The nonce, Â ,-, is select at random by Alice from the list of active tokens 
and ensures message freshness. The message integrity is protected using a 
MAC which is signed by Alice. 
2. Bob => Alice: {Ni -f 1}KA,B 
Bob having received the request for communication can confirm that the 
message did come from Alice and that it has not been altered. The freshness 
of the message is guaranteed by the use of a nonce, Ni, which was recently 
broadcast by the Beacon. Since the nonce can be used only once there is 
of course a finite probability that the nonce chosen by the Alice from the 
active list has already been presented to Bob by someone else. In such a 
case the request would be rejected and Alice would have to re-apply with an 
other nonce. The probability of such a collision occurring is dependent on 
factors such as network load, token frequency and token life. In a practical 
applications the additional load caused by this effect should be minimal. 
Having received a session key which he can trust. Bob completes the protocol 
by authenticating himself to Alice. He enciphers the modified nonce with a 
session key and sends it to Alice. Since only Bob could have obtained session 
key, the message proves Bob's identity. 
5 Beacoiiizing the Needham and Schroeder Protocol 
The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol [8] is arguably one of the best known 
authentication and key distribution protocols. It has been the basis of a number 
of systems that use the nonce to prove freshness. In 1981 Denning and Sacco [9] 
pointed out a weakness in the NS protocol and suggested the use of time-stamped 
certificates to guard against a replay attack. Since that time authentication 
it is meant, the certificates must be valid for a duration of time. The length of the 
certificate lifetime would depend on factors such as synchronization discrepancy 
between hosts and communication delays. During this period the protocol is 
vulnerable to a replay attack. Thus if the certificate lifetime is kept short, the 
protocol reduces the likelihood of a replay attack, but it does not eliminate it. 
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer able 
to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be kept short 
to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all conversations. 
5.3 A Beacon Based Approach 
We now introduce a Beacon to the distributed system and modify the NS proto-
col to take advantage of the new service. As in the unmodified NS protocol, the 
beaconized protocol can be divided into two sections. The first enables a princi-
pal to obtain another's public key. The second, the connection protocol, is used 
by a principal to initiate a conversation. We end this section by modifying the 
connection protocol to include the distribution of a symmetric session key. Once 
again we will use the over worked principals, Alice and Bob, to demo\istrate the 
protocol features. 
Public Key Distribution Protocol 
The following are the step required for Alice to obtain Bob's public key. 
1. Alice AS: Alice,Bob 
Alice sends a message to the AS stating her name is Alice and requesting 
Bob's public key. The message is in plain-text and only contains the two 
identities. 
2. AS Alice: Boh.YB, N i , { M A C } x ^ s 
Since the reply to Alice contains no secret information, the message is not 
enciphered. As in the NS protocol the message contains the requested public 
key and the name of the key's owner. This ensures that the request made by 
Alice has not been altered. The nonce, Ni, is picked randomly by the Beacon 
from the list of active tokens and is used to guarantee that this message is 
not a replay. The message integrity is ensured by the MAC which is signed 
by the AS. 
Since the Beacon based system uses the concept of a "one use token", if Ni 
has previously been presented to Alice, then it would have been marked and con-
sequently the AS's reply would be rejected. In such circumstances, Alice would 
have to reinitated the request. The probability of such a collision occurring, in 
a practical application, is quite low. 
Connection Protocol 
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain the required keys, the 
following is the step required for Alice to initiate a conversation. 
1. Alice => Bob: A\ice,Ni,{MAC}x^ 
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains her 
name and the nonce, Ni. The nonce is selected at random by Alice from the 
list of active tokens and is used to ensures message freshness. The message 
integrity is protected using a MAC which is signed by Alice. Since the mes-
sage contains no secret information it is not encrypted with Bob's public 
key. 
If Â i has previously been presented to Bob, then it would have been marked and 
the request for connection would be rejected. In such an event Bob would reply 
with an error message and Alice would select another nonce and reinitiate the 
request. 
Distribution of a Symmetric key. 
At present it is not feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption. Thus, 
it is quiet desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key system is 
used for authentication and distribution of a session key. The session key would 
then be used by the two principals to communicate securely using a symmetric 
key system. We now modify the protocol to allow the two principals, Alice aaid 
Bob, to share a session key. 
1. Alice Bob: Alice,A^i, 
Alice would initiate such an exchange by sending Bob a message containing 
her nariie, the nonce Ni, and the session key, KA,B- Once again Ni is used 
to ensure freshness. Since the session key is the only secret in the message, 
it is the only part that is enciphered with Bob's public key, V^.The message 
integrity is protected using a MAC which is signed by Alice. 
5.4 Attacks on the Modified Protocol 
The attacks that can be launched against the beaconized protocol can be broken 
up in to six categories. In the following section the effects of these are discussed 
in turn. 
- In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of the 
principals in the system. Since the principal's secret key is used to prove its 
identity, for such an attack to succeed an adversary would require knowledge 
of such a key. If a principal's secret key were to be compromised, it is possible 
that an adversary could masquerade as that principal while the problem was 
undetected and thus before a new key is distributed. However unlike the NS 
protocol, an adversary is unable to block the distribution of new keys. 
- By eavesdropping (or monitoring) network traffic, an adversary hopes to gain 
some advantage or learn some secret. Since the public key protocol does not 
require the transmission of any secret information, such an attack cannot 
succeed. In the case of the hybrid system, the session key is encipher. Thus 
an adversary would require knowledge of the deciphering key. 
- The goal of a Tt-play attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowledge 
by retransmitting a message that was intercepted earlier. There are three 
distinct areas in which a replay attack could be attempted. They are: 
1. The token transmitted by the Beacon. The purpose of this message is to 
broadcast a unique token to all hosts on the network. Since the token has 
a finite life, if an expired token were retransmitted, the message would 
simply be discarded. Replaying the message before the token expires 
gains no advantage for the adversary as the duplicate token would be 
detected and thus discarded. 
2. The second attempt could be made against the public key distribution 
portion of the protocol. The protocol consists of two message. The effect 
of replaying these would be: 
• The protocol is initiated by a principal request another principals 
public key. The request is in plain-text and is direct to the AS. Since 
the information is public and service is freely available, the adversary 
can gain nothing new. 
• The reply from the AS contains the requested public key. Since the 
message is unique; in that it contains the name of the recipient, a 
one use nonce and is signed by the sender, a replayed message would 
be detected. 
3. The final message that could be replayed is the request for connection. 
This message is also unique, thus a replayed message would detect and 
the attack would fail. 
- A modification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets as they 
travel across the computer network. For such an attack to succeed the change 
must be undetected. Such an attack would be futile because the recipient of 
a message is always able to detect any changes. 
- An attempt to delay authentication messages would cause the token to expire 
and prevent the principal from completing the authentication process. Such 
an attack would have the same results as "denial of service". 
- A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary that is able to 
hinder communications is some manner. Detection and countering such an 
attack is best dealt with by other means such as statistical monitoring of 
the network. 
6 Discussion on Advantages 
In this section we discuss the advantages gained by use of a beaconized ap-
proach over the NS protocol or the time base protocol suggested by Denning 
and Sacco. Due to constraints on space the discussion has been kept brief and 
the presentation of results is left to the full paper. 
The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol has been the basis for a number of 
systems. The approach taken by them requires principals, wishing to establish 
a conversation, to engage in a three step message exchange. The purpose of 
this exchange is to ascertain the identity of the other principal and to guard 
against a replay attack. The distribution of public keys is provided by a trusted 
authentication server, AS. In the worst case, where both principals require the 
services of the AS to obtain public keys, the protocol requires a total of seven 
messages to be exchanged. 
In [9], Denning and Sacco pointed out that the NS protocol is vulnerable to 
a replay attack in the event that a principal's key is compromised. To over come 
this difficulty, Denning and Sacco suggested the use of time-stamped certificates. 
The resulting protocol requires a principal who wishes to initiate a conversation, 
to contact the AS to obtain two certificates; one for each principal. Each cer-
tificate has a finite life and contains a public key. One benefit of this approach 
is that the number of messages required to initiate a conversation is reduced to 
three. However, during the period between the certificate being issued and expir-
ing, the modified protocol is also is vulnerable to a replay attack. The protocol 
does not eliminate the possibility of a replay attack, but reduces it. 
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer able 
to cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be kept short 
to minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all conversations. 
This means that a greater amount of trust is invested in the AS and the realm 
now has a single point of failure. 
The fundamental diff"erence between our approach is the use of a Beacon to 
deliver a "one use token" to each host. This simplifies the authentication process 
by taking advantage of the features of a public key cryptographic system. In 
contrast to the modification proposed by Denning and Sacco, the beaconized 
approach eliminates the possibility of a replay attack, allows principals to cache 
commonly used keys and reduces the role of the AS "key look-up service". 
7 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have attempted to show that the use Beacons can simplify 
authentication in a distributed system. The main advantage of our approach 
is the elimination of the possibility of a replay attack while maintaining the 
minimum level of trust being invested in the "third party authentication server". 
This reliance on a trusted agent requires a great deal of trust to be concentrated 
at one point, addes to the level of system complexity and reduces flexibility. 
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Abstract 
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties was first suggested by M. 
Rabin in "Transactions protected by beacons", Journal of Computer and System Sciences, Vol 
27, pp 256-267, 1983. In this paper we revive Rabin's ideas which have been largely 
overlooked in the past decade. In particular we present a novel approach to the authentication 
problem based on a service called Beacon which continuously broadcasts certified nonces. We 
argue that this approach considerably simplifies the solution to the authentication problem and 
we illustrate the impact of such a service by presenting a "Beaconizing" authentication protocol. 
The modified protocol would be suitable for deployment at upper layers of the communication 
stack. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past thirty years the rapid evolution of electronic data communication has been breath 
taking. This growth and reliance on electronic communication has increased concern about data 
privacy and integrity. Much effort is currendy being devoted to providing security^ services for a 
variety of communication environments. Authentication is universally acknowledged as being 
essential for secure communications in a distributed information system. Informally, 
authentication is the capability of the recipient of a communication to be able to verify that the 
message did come from the alleged sender. As a further requirement, it is usual to expect such 
systems to perform verification over an open insecure network. This requirement constrains the 
authentication system in the following manner: 
• Reliance must not be placed in the physical security of all hosts in the distributed system. 
• It should be assumed that packets travelling along the network can be read, modified and 
inserted with littie effort by an adversary. 
• Trust cannot be based on the sender's address. 
• Trust cannot be based on the sender's operating system security. 
Currently, the dominant authentication protocols employed in a client-server environment use a 
broker to arbitrate between principals who wish to communicate. In such a scheme, a principal 
must first contact tiie broker to obtain credentials which can be trusted by its communicating 
partner. The protocol will typically rely on an exchange of cryptographic messages and the 
participant's knowledge of some secret. Well known examples of such systems are Kerberos 
(Steiner et al 1988), KiyptoKnight (Molvai et al 1993) and Kuperee (Hardjono et al 1993). 
In this paper we present a novel approach to the authentication problem for a distributed 
information system using a public key cryptographic system and we introduce a new service 
called Beacon which has been inspired by Rabin (1983). A Beacon broadcasts, at regular 
intervals,'certified nonces which are accessible to all hosts within the network. In section 4 we 
revive Rabin's novel idea by giving a brief description of his method. In section 5 we provide a 
backdrop by describing some of the issues involved in authentication. In the next three sections 
we describe the beaconized approach to authentication. Finally we end by describing some of 
the advantages of this approach and we make some concluding remarks. 
TERMINOLOGY 
Throughout this paper certain terms are used that may appear to be ambiguous or new to 
readers. In the following section the use of these terms, in the context of this document, are 
stated This should avoid any difficulty caused by them being used differently elsewhere. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word nonce to mean "coined for one occasion". In 
the context of this paper a nonce is a random number that is freshly generated for on one 
occasion. The random number is generated using a suitable generator and is of sufficient length 
to make it infeasible for an adversary to produce i t 
A host is a computer with a unique address that is connected to a computer network. 
The user is the human being who is using some services that are provided by the network. J^ 
programs in the system are initiated by users. The main purpose of authentication is to verify 
the identity of the users within a network. 
A client is a program that runs on behalf of a user in order to request some service that is 
available on a remote host Since the client runs on a user's behalf, it assumes the user identity 
and privileges. Any action taken by a client is said to have been carried out by the user. 
The server is a program that provides a service to a client on the network. It is usually installed 
by the system administrator and runs on behalf of the system. A server remains active in a 
network for much longer than a client and thus is given an identity. By this it is meant that each 
server is registered with the system, in a similar manner to a user, and that it must prove its 
identity before a client will accept i t 
Any communicating network entity, that is client or server, can be referred to as a principal, 
A realm is organised in a hierarchical structure and has a strong analogy to domains in Internet 
A single authentication server, be it a Beacon or Third-party Authenticator, is responsible for aU 
local principals. This coUection of network entities, the auiientication server and its clients, are 
referred to as a realm. A client who wishes to obtain some service from a server within the 
same realm would use the service to prove its identity. 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC REQUIREMENTS 
The Beacon based system relies on a public key (or asymmetric) cryptographic system. Many 
such systems have been designed and examples of such schemes can be found in (Zheng et al 
1992, Rivest et al 1978). For the purpose of our discussions the system's cryptographic 
requirements can be simplified and kept generic. 
A public key system differs fix)m a secret key (or symmetric) system in that each principal in the 
distributed systern has a pair of keys. The calculation of this private and public key pair, given 
the initial conditions, is easy. However, it would be infeasible for an adversary who knows a 
public key to calculate the secret key or the initial conditions. Each principal has a private key 
which is kept secret and is only known to that principal. The corresponding public key is made 
available to all other principals. In the remainder of this paper" { means encipher mth key 
"Z". The private and public key pair will be denoted as "X" and "Y" respectively and subscripts 
will be used to identify the associated principal. Thus the Beacon would have a key pair XgN. 
YgN» the principal, Alice, would have the pair X^, Yp̂  while Bob would have Xg, Yg. 
The advantage of a public key system is that it supports secrecy, authentication, and integrity. 
Communication secrecy is supported by the transformations: M = { { M } y „ That is, B B 
suppose Alice wishes to send a secret message, M, to Bob. Then Alice must have access to 
Bob's public key and encipher the message, as: C = { M lyg-Alice sends Bob the 
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cryptographic string C. On receipt Bob is able to employ his private key to decipher the 
message.Thus {C Ix^ = { { M l y ^ Ix^ = M. 
The encryption and decryption processes are easy using the appropriate keys. However, it 
would be infeasible for an adversary to decipher C without the private key Xg, ensuring 
secrecy. Now, since Yg is publicly known. Bob has no way of being certain of the sender's 
identity. Thus authenticity has not been assured using this method. 
Authentication, using a public key system, is satisfied by the following transformation, thus M = { { M ) x . l y A • Alice is able to "sign" her message to Bob by using her private key, X^, Pi. A so C = { M } x . . Bob is able to verify that the message could have only come from Alice by Pi. deciphering the message using Alice's public key, Yy ,̂ as: {C }y = {{ M}x. }y. = M. If the Pi. A A. message is plain-text. Bob knows that C has in fact not been altered. However, if the message, or any portion of the message, is a random string then it may be difficult for Bob to ascertain that the message has not been altered merely by examining it. For this reason it is more usual for Alice to employ a suitable one-way hashing function (eg. Rivest 1992, Zheng et al 1993) to produce a Message Authentication Code (MAC). Alice would sign the MAC with her private key and append it to the message. On receiving the message. Bob is able to reproduce the MAC in order to confirm that the message is from Alice and that it has not been altered. Finally, all three can be employed by Alice to communicate securely with Bob thus: C={M,{MAC}x^}y3. 
RABIN S APPROACH USING BEACONS 
The use of a Beacon as a security service within a distributed computer system was first suggested by M. Rabin (1983). He defined a Beacon as emitting, at regular interval, a random integer sealed using a suitable cryptographic signature system. The integer would be selected randomly and uniformly within the range 1 to N, where N is publicly known. With this basic concept he proposed two protocols based on a probabilistic approach, one for the signing of contracts and the second for infoimation disclosure. In the following section Rabin's use of Beacons is illustrated by briefly outlining the contract signing protocol. For a full account, the reader is referred to the original paper. 
Contract Signing Using a Beacon 
Consider, Alice and Bob have negotiated a contract over a computer network and are ready to exchange signed copies. It is not possible for them to meet and they wish using the network to exchange electronically. We can assume that the contracts can be signed by an suitable electronic signature scheme. The problem addressed by Rabin was, if Alice signs and sends the contract to Bob, then Alice is committed, but Bob is not. Bob could take the opportunity to look for a better deal, leaving Alice vulnerable. A similar argument can be made about Bob. 
In Rabin's protocol we can assume the following initial conditions: 
Each of the participants has an asymmetric cryptographic key pair which can be used for 
signing messages and verifying signatures. The Beacon has the private and public key 
pair XbN' YbN' Alice's keys are Xa, Ya and Bob's are Xb, Yb- The public keys, Ybn, 
Ya and Yb are widely known and are available to the participants. Each participant's 
private key has been kept secret and is known only to its owner. 
The Beacon broadcasts a token, T every A seconds and the next broadcast will be at time t 
+ A. The token, T, has the following foim: T = { t, i Ixbn' ^^^^^ ^ ^̂  ^^^ ^^^ ^̂  ^^^^^ 
the token was emitted and i is a randomly selected integer between 1 and N. The value of N is publicly known. The Beacon seals the token using its private key Xbn-
Alice and Bob have agreed to the contract name, C, such that: C = h(contract) where a 
suitable hash function h is applied to the text of the contract and the obtained result is used 
to denote the contract 
• Alice and Bob have agreed and signed preliminary agreements. We will refer to ±ese 
agreements signed by Alice and Bob as PA and PB respectively. The text of PA is as 
follows: 
{ If Bob can produce {CJJxj^ and (TJx^^M some token T, then I, Alice will be 
committed to the contract as of the time t mentioned in the token T 
Bob signs a similar contract with the name Alice and Bob exchanged. Since this 
agreement does not bind either parties to the contract, it reasonable to assume that this 
initial exchange will pass off without incident 
The protocol for the exchange of contracts requires that both parties follow a timed sequence. 
The exchange is aborted if one party fails to transmit the specified message within the allocated 
time. The exchange takes place in the time between Beacon broadcasts. This time A is divided 
in six equal segments. The protocol is as follows: 
1. t < time < t + A/6 Alice Bob: PA 
2. Bob Alice: PB 
3. t + A/6 < time <t +A/3 Alice Bob: ÍA 
4. t + A/3>time < t + A/2 Bob Alice: ÍB 5. i = ía + ifi n̂ od N 
6. t + A/2< time < t + 2A/3 Alice Bob: {C,i,t+ 
7. Bob Alice:{C,i,t+ 
Within the first segment (steps 1 and 2) the two parties are required to exchange the preliminary 
contract. In the next two segments both Alice and Bob exchange random number that each has 
generated independently, that is ÍA and ÍB- Each party is then able to calculate i. Last, (steps 6 
and 7) the two parties sign and exchange the messages that could bind them to the contract 
These messages contain the contract name, C, and possibly the next token. If neither party has 
cheated and tiiie next token emitted by the Beacon contains i, then both parties are committed to 
the contract at the same time. If the next emitted token does not contain i, then neither parties are 
committed and steps 3 to 7 have to be repeated. Rabin showed that in such an exchange there is 
a probability of 1/N that one of the parties could cheat successfully. 
THE AUTHENTICATION PROBLEM 
In a distributed system the need to promote trust between principals that are physically separate 
is fundamental. The basis of this trust is the ability of principals to authenticate messages it 
receives. In this section we will consider some of the issues involved in authentication. We will 
base our discussion on the well known public key protocol proposed by Needham and 
Schroeder (1978) and it's modification in Denning and Sacco (1981). 
Authentication Server 
An authentication server (AS) is used as a broker who can provide a common point of trust for 
two principals wishing to communicate. Each principal with a realm which is dominated by a 
particular AS, is required to register his or her public key with that AS. To establish trust 
between principals within a realm, the AS must have the trust of all principals within its realm, 
so as to be able to maintain and distribute these keys reliably. 
(a) Needham and Schroeder Protocol 
In the Needham and Schroeder Protocol the role of the As is to distribute the public keys of 
principals within its realm. A principal can apply to the AS for the public key of another 
principal and thus the key obtained can be trusted. Consider the situation where Alice wishes to 
communicate with Bob. If she is not certain of Bob's public key, she must first apply to the AS 
to obtain Bob's public key. The steps required are as follows: 
1. Alice => AS: Alice, Bob 
Alice sends a message to the AS requesting the public key. The requesting message is in 
clear text and contains the names of both principals. 
2. AS Alice: {Bob, YB 1x^3 
The AS responds with a message containing the requested public key and is signed with 
the AS's private key. The message contains the name of the key's owner which allows 
Alice to verify that the reply contains the correct key. 
This exchange (steps 1 and 2) does not by itself provide any assurance that the request 
was initiated by Alice or the freshness of the AS's reply. '' 
3. Alice => Bob: {Na, Alice}Yg 
Alice is able to initiate the authentication process by sending Bob a message which 
contains a nonce, Nyŝ , and her identity. The message is enciphered with Bob's public 
key, YB, which means only Bob will be able to access N/̂ . 
4. Bob Alice: {NA,NB}Y^ 
On receiving the message, Bob requires Alice's public key in order to obtain the nonce 
N/^. If Bob does not have the key in his cache of frequently used keys then he must 
obtain it from the AS (see steps 1 and 2). 
Once Bob has obtained N^, he still cannot be certain of freshness nor who is the actual 
sender. To verify identity and guard against a replay attack. Bob generates a nonce, NB, 
and sends it to Alice. Bob proves his identity to Alice by including N^ in the reply. The 
message to Alice is encrypted with Alice's public key. 
5. Alice =i> Bob: {NBIYB 
As a final step in this authentication process, Alice proves her identity to Bob by returning 
NB-
Even if both principals were certain of the other's public key, the step authentication 
process (steps 3,4 and 5) is still required to ensure freshness and guard against a replay 
attack. 
Message Freshness 
(a) Protocol Weakness 
Denning and Sacco (1981) analysed the protocol and pointed out that it is only secure while 
there hasn't been a key compromise. They showed that in the event of a compromise the 
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protocol is no longer secure. To examine the weakness let us suppose that an adversary, Charles, has managed to obtain Alice's private key. Also he has been able to record past conversations between the AS, Bob and Alice. Charles is able to use these to maintain confidence in Alice's public key. He does this by replaying an old response by the AS to a request for Alice's public key. The replay of course distributes the compromised key. To illustrate, the following showis how Charles is able to trick Bob. 
1. Bob => AS: Bob, Alice Bob send s a message to AS requesting Alice's public key. 
2. Charles => Bob: {Alice, ^̂ AIX̂ S 
Charles intercepts the message and replies to the request by replaying an old key distribution message. Since the reply is signed by the AS, Bob is tricked into accepting the message and thus the compromised key Yp̂ . 
Since the key distribution message never expires and does not contain the name of the requesting principal, Charles will be able to trick any principal within the realm until the AS changes its key pair. Not only is Charles able to masquerade as Alice but also by blocking the distribution of her key, he can deny her any service he chooses. 
(b) Denning and Sacco's Modification ^ 
The solution suggested by Denning and Sacco uses time stamped certificates. The fonn of these 
certificates is as follows: Ao where: P is the principal's identification. Yp is the public key belonging to principal P. 
T is the time at which the certificate was issued. 
X^s is the AS's private key which is used to sign the certificate. 
The Denning and Sacco modified protocol combines the authentication and key distribution into a single process. That is, if the principals are able to obtain public keys reliably and message freshness can be guaranteed, then the communicating principals are able to use the features of their public key cryptographic system to authenticate messages. The step of the modified protocol are as follows: 
1. Alice AS: Alice, Bob 
As before Alice sends a message to the AS. The message requests two certificates, one containing Bob's public key and the other containing Alice's public key. 
2. AS Alice: Ca, Cg 
The AS responds with a message containing two signed certificates. C^ contains Alice's 
public key and Cg contains Bob's. 
3. Alice =>Bob:CA,CB 
Alice initiate the conversation with Bob by sending the certificates. Since the certificates are signed by the AS and contain the time-stamp to prove freshness. Bob is able to trust them. 
Denning and Sacco pointed out that in order for Alice to obtain the certificate and deliver them to Bob, the certificates must have a lifetime. By this it is meant, the certificates must be valid for a duration of time. The length of the certificate lifetime would depend on factors such as synchronisation discrepancy between hosts and communication delays. During this period the 
protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack. Thus if the certificate lifetime is kept short, the protocol 
reduces the likelihood of a replay attack, but it does not eliminate it 
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer able to cache commonly 
used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be kept short to minimise the risk of a replay 
attack, the AS must initiate all conversation. 
BEACONS 
Rabin's novel ideas on the use of beacons have been largely overlooked by the research 
community during the past decade. We revive these ideas by transferring them to the 
authentication problem. The following is a more detailed description of the concept, feasibility 
and implementation of a Beacon. 
A Beacon, within the context of this paper, is a service that is provided by a secure host in a 
computer network. The Beacon broadcasts, at regular intervals, a nonce encapsulated within a 
certified token. The emitted token would be accessible to all hosts on the network and each 
host maintains a short list of fresh tokens. The additional load caused by this service would be 
small as each host is only required to listen for a short and relatively infrequent message. 
Token 
The token has the following form: Ni,time,life,{MAC}xgj^, where Nj is a freshly generated 
nonce; time is the time at which the token was emitted; life is the time after which the token will 
not be valid; MAC is the message authentication code; Xg^ is the Beacon's secret encryption 
key which is used to certify the token. 
Each host which receives the token is able to verify its validity by decrypting the MAC using 
the Beacon's public key. The MAC insures that the token has not been tampered with. Since the 
token is signed with the Beacon's secret key it is reasonable to assume the token originated 
from the Beacon. Each host is able to maintain, on behalf of its principals, a short list of 
currently valid tokens. Thus these tokens are available to all principals to use in the 
authentication process. 
Network Synchronisation 
There is reliance within a Beacon based system that each principal has access to a stable clock 
and that these clocks are to some extent synchronised. Since the life of a token can be relatively 
long, say an hour, differences of a few seconds between the hosts can be tolerated. In this 
section we examine the Internet's Network Time Protocol (NTP) to show that in fact it is 
feasible to have much closer synchronisation between communication hosts. 
In a typical configuration used at the University of Illinois and the University of Delaware, the 
institutions operate three campus servers. These servers are synchronised using two primary 
servers and each other. The three campus servers in turn provide synchronisation for 
department servers which then deliver time to remaining hosts. In such a configuration of 
several hundi^d synchronisation milliseconds-seconds would not be uncommon. 
Creating a Beacon 
As stated above, a Beacon is a service which, at regular intervals, emits a token which can be 
authenticated. The emitted token must be accessible to all hosts on the network and each host is 
required to maintain a short list of fresh tokens. Since the broadcast is short and relatively 
infrequent, implementation is quite feasible in either software or hardware. The following 
algorithm shows the functionality. 
1. t = system_clock + A 
2. Ni = G() 
3. MACi = h(t, l i fe,Ni) 
4. T = t, life, Nj, { M A Q Ixgj^ 
5. while (clock < t) wait() 
6. broadcast( T ) 
7. goto(step 1) 
The algorithm begins by setting, t, the time for the next broadcast. Next, the token is 
constructed prior to broadcasting (steps 2 to 4). The cryptographically strong pseudo-random 
generator, GQ, is used to create a nonce Nj. The final component required to create the token is 
the message authentication code (MAC). The one-way hash function, h, is employed to 
compress the bit string created by the concatenation of the broadcast time, t, the token life, 1 and 
the nonce Nj. The output, which is of a fixed length, is used as the MAC. The token, T 
consists of the MAC, MACi, signed with the Beacon's private key and the other three fields. 
The token is broadcast at time t (steps 5 and 6). The algorithm is then repeated (step 7). 
One-time Token 
With a Beacon based system, a "One-time token" can be used to simplify the process. By One-
time token it is meant that a token emitted by the Beacon can be used only once to obtain service 
from a particular server; much like an admission ticket to a theatre. Once the token has been 
presented, it is marked and will not be accepted by that server on any subsequent occasion. The 
process of marking tokens is much easier for the server than maintaining a database of prior 
requests. The use of One-time tokens eliminates the possibility of a replay attack and thus 
simplifies the process. 
A BEACON BASED APPROACH 
We now introduce a Beacon to the distributed system and present an authentication protocol that 
takes advantage of the new service. The beaconized protocol can be divided into two sections. 
The first enables a principal to obtain another's public key. The second, the connection 
protocol, is used by a principal to initiate a conversation. We end this section by modifying the 
connection protocol to include the distribution of a symmetric session key. Once again we will 
use the over worked principals, Alice and Bob, to demonstrate the protocol features. 
Public Key Distribution Protocol 
The following are the step required for Alice to obtain Bob's public key. 
1. Alice AS: Alice,Bob 
Alice sends a message to the AS stating her name is Alice and requesting Bob's public 
key. The message is in plain-text and only contains the two identities. 
2. AS => AHce: Bob,YB, N i , {MAC}x . . 
_ ̂  JK.O 
Since the reply to Alice contains no secret information, die message is not enciphered. As 
in the NS protocol the message contains the requested public key and the name of the 
key's owner. This ensures that the request made by Alice has not been altered. The 
nonce, Nj, is picked randomly by the Beacon from the list of active tokens and is used to 
guarantee that this message is not a replay. The message integrity is ensured by the MAC 
which is signed by the AS. 
Since the Beacon based system uses the concept of a "One-time token", if Nj has previously 
been presented to Alice, then it would have been marked and consequently the AS's reply 
would be rejected. In such circumstances, Alice would have to reinitated the request. The 
probability of such a collision occurring, in a practical application, is quite low. 
Connection Protocol 
Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain the required keys, the following is the step 
required for Alice to initiate a conversation. 
1. Alice Bob: Alice,Ni,{MAC}x 
Alice initiates the exchange by sending Bob a message which contains her name and the 
nonce, Nj. The nonce is selected at random by Alice from the list of active tokens and is 
used to enpres message freshness. The message integrity is protected using a MAC 
which is signed by Alice. Since the message contains no secret information it is not 
encrypted with Bob's public key. 
If Nj has previously been presented to Bob, then it would have been marked and the request for 
connection would be rejected. In such an event Bob would reply with an error message and 
Alice would select another nonce and reinitiate the request. 
Distribution of a Symmetric key 
At present it is not feasible to use a public key system for bulk encryption. Tl>us, it is quiet 
desirable to create a hybrid system in which a public key system is used for authentication and 
distribution of a session key. The session key would then be used by the two principals to 
communicate securely using a symmetric key system. We now modify the protocol to allow the 
two principals, Alice and Bob, to share a session key. 
1. Alice => Bob: Alice,Ni,{KA,B}YT5'{^^^}XA o A 
Alice would initiate such an exchange by sending Bob a message containing her name, 
the nonce Nj, and the session key, K^^b- Once again Nj is used to ensure freshness. 
Since the session key is the only secret in the message, it is the only part that is 
enciphered with Bob's public key, Yg. The message integrity is protected using a MAC 
which is signed by Alice. 
ATTACKS ON THE MODIFIED PROTOCOL 
The attacks that can be launched against the beaconized protocol can be broken up in to six 
categories. In the following section the effects of these are discussed in turn. 
1. In a masquerade attack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of the principals in the 
system. Since the principal's secret key is used to prove its identity, for such an attack to 
succeed an adversary would require knowledge of such a key. If a principal's secret key 
were to be compromised, it is possible that an adversary could masquerade as that 
principal while the problem was undetected and thus before a new key is distributed. 
However unlike the NS protocol, an adversary is unable to block the distribution of new 
keys. 
2. By eavesdropping (or monitoring) network traffic, an adversary hopes to gain some 
advantage or learn some secret. Since the public key protocol does not require the 
transmission of any secret information, such an attack cannot succeed. In the case of the 
hybrid system, the session key is encipher. Thus an adversary would require knowledge 
of the deciphering key. 
3. The goal of a replay attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowledge by 
retransmitting a message that was intercepted earlier. There are three distinct areas in 
which a replay attack could be attempted. They are: 
i. The token transmitted by the Beacon. The puipose of this message is to broadcast a 
unique token to all hosts on the network. Since the token has a finite life, if an 
expired token were retransmitted, the message would simply be discarded. 
Replaying the message before the token expires gains no advantage for the 
adversary as the duplicate token would be detected and thus discarded. 
ii. The second attempt could be made against the public key distribution portion of the 
protocol. The protocol consists of two message. The effect of replaying these 
would be: 
a. The protocol is initiated by a principal request another principals public key. 
The request is in plain-text and is direct to the AS. Since the information is 
public and service is freely available, the adversary can gain nothing new. 
b. The reply from the AS contains the requested public key. Since the message is 
unique; in that it contains the name of the recipient, a one use nonce and is 
signed by the sender, a replayed message would be detected. 
iii. The final message that could be replayed is the request for connection. This 
message is also unique, thus a replayed message would be detect and the attack 
would fail. 
4. A modification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets as they travel across 
the computer network. For such an attack to succeed the change must be undetected. Such 
an attack would be futile because the recipient of a message is always able to detect any 
changes. 
5. An attempt to delay authentication messages would cause the token to expire and prevent 
the principal from completing the authentication process. Such an attack would have the 
same results as "denial of service". 
6. A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary that is able to hinder 
communications is some manner. Detection and countering such an attack is best dealt 
with by other means such as statistical monitoring of the network. 
DISCUSSION ON ADVANTAGES 
In this section we discuss the five main advantages gained by the use of a beaconized approach. 
We will contract the approach with those in (Needham et al 1978) and QDenning et al 1981). 
The beaconized approach requires fewer steps for principals to establish a connection. The 
approach taken by Needham and Schroeder (NS) requires between three and seven steps 
for two piincipals to establish a connection. In Denning and Sacco (DS) modified protocol 
three steps are required. The beaconized protocol requires one step if both principal have 
cached the required keys. The procedure for a principal to acquire the public key of a 
communicating partner requires two steps. 
The beaconized protocol eliminates the possibility of a replay attack. The same cannot be 
said of the either of the two protocols. 
• Unlike the DS protocol, the beaconized approach allows principals to cache commonly 
used keys. 
• Unlike the DS protocol^the beaconized approach keeps the role of the AS to simply the 
distribution of public keys. 
• Unlike the NS protocol, the beaconized approach does no require each principal to have 
the ability to generate nonces. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have attempted to show that the use Beacons can simplify authentication in a 
distributed system. The main advantage of our approach is the elimination of the possibility of 
a replay attack while maintaining the minimum level of trust being invested in the "third party 
authentication server". This reliance on a trusted agent requires a great deal of trust to be 
concentrated at one point, adds to the level of system complexity and reduces flexibility. 
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